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Innis M. Christie* Canadian Academic Tenure
David J. Mullan** and Employment: An
Uncertain Future?
I. Introduction
Canadian academic employment relationships can be said to fall
into three categories:
1) The traditional "contract-statute" relationship
2) The collective bargaining relationship, and
3) The "special plan" relationship.1
What is the legal nature of each of these relationships and what
are the implications of each? Which issues have proved, or could
prove, sensitive in the "contract-statute" setting? Can collective
agreements or special plans provide better solutions? These are the
fundamental legal questions, but tenure issues loom so large that
they tend to swallow up the other questions and answers. 2
What follows is organized generally as, first, consideration of the
legal nature of each of the three "categories" of academic
employment relationships; second, discussion of the sensitive issues
in the traditional relationship and, third, assessment of special plans
and collective bargaining. That organization breaks down somewhat
because the legal nature of the traditional contract-statute
relationship necessarily involves an extended consideration of
tenure, the most sensitive issue in that relationship. Finally, because
a very significant feature of collective bargaining for academics will
be its impact on tenure, tenure becomes an important part of the
concluding section as well.
The concern here is not with the law relating to any particular
university or of any one province, although the setting in which this
material was originally presented is, perhaps, reflected in the extent
*Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Lansdowne Visiting Professor, University
of Victoria, 1980-81
**Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario
1. A phrase coined originally at U.B.C. apparently, and now widely used by the
CAUT in its official literature. For example, see G. England and I. McKenna,
"Special Plan Collective Agreements" (19'77), 25(4) CAUT Bulletin.
2. This paper is an amalgam of two; "University Employment: The Canadian
Experience" by Professor Christie and "Tenure: Employment For Life or an
Uncertain Future?" by Professor Mullan. They have been stitched together by
Professor Christie, who takes responsibility for the seams, and for the non-tenure
aspects of the product. Credit for the tenure aspects belongs to Professor Mullan.
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of the references to British Columbia legislation. 3 References to
particular collective agreements are illustrative only, and may not
be in accord with the most recently negotiated amendments.
II. Legal Nature of the Relationship
(1) The Contract-Statute Relationship. Market and other social
forces dramatically changed Canadian universities in the 1960s4 but
the general principles of law that governed the employment of
academics did not change with the move from the authoritarian era
of apparent stability and tranquility 5 into the post Duff-Berdah 6
period of greatly increased faculty participation in university
government until the advent of collective bargaining for faculty
members. The rights and obligations of academic employees and
their employer universities were determined by individual contracts
of employment, modified in incidental ways by pr',inzi-al
employment law statutes of general application, and, more
significantly, by the special or general university acts establishing
the universities and empowering their boards of governors and,
possibly, other organs and officers, to do particular things in
particular ways. In universities where no union has been certified as
3. The two original papers were first presented at a conference on Universities and
the Law sponsored by the Faculty of Law, University of Victoria in the spring of
1980. Copies of all papers presented are available from the faculty offices. Our
thanks to the Faculty, particularly the organizer, Professor W. A. W. Neilson and
former Dean Murray Fraser, for support and permission to publish here.
We are grateful to Vic Sim of CAUT and to Professor Geoffrey England, Faculty of
Law, University of Alberta (Lethbridge) for access to materials held by CAUT.
Professor Mullan received helpful comments from his colleagues Dan Soberman
and John Whyte. Previous Canadian writing to which we are in some debt includes,
particularly: Bora Laskin, "Some Cases at Law" in A Place of Liberty (ed. George
Whalley) (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1964) at 177; Daniel A. Soberman, "Tenure in
Canadian Universities" (1965), 13 CAUT Bulletin 5; Yves Ouellette, "Le contr6le
judiciaire sur l'universit6" (1970), 48 Can. B. Rev. 631; G.H.L. Fridman,
"Judicial Intervention Into University Affairs" (1973), 21 Chitty's L.J. 181 and
"The Nature of a Professorial Contract" in Universities and the Law (ed. Paul
Thomas) (Legal Research Institute of Manitoba, 1976) at 7; R. Lynn Campbell,
"Tenure and Tenure Review in Canadian Universities" (1981), 26 Mc G.L.J. 362.
4. B.L. Adell and D.D. Carter, Collective Bargaining for University Faculty in
Canada (1972), at 3-4 and 15 ff.
5. Sibley, Modes of University Government (1976), Can. J. Higher Ed. 19,
quoted in 0. Carrigan "Unionization in Canadian Universities" (1977)
(unpublished).
6. University Government in Canada: Report of a Commission Sponsored by the
CAUT and the AUCC (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1966). See Adell and Carter,
supra, note 2 at 20.
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collective bargaining agent for the faculty those are still, essentially,
the three sources of law governing the academic employment
relationship.
In Alberta and British Columbia there are general University Acts
applying to all universities: In British Columbia, for example, the
Universities Act 7 sets out the powers of the Board of Governors, the
Senate, the President and the Faculties at the University of British
Columbia, the University of Victoria and Simon Fraser University.
In other provinces each university has its own enabling statute.
The Act relating to Dalhousie8, for example, sets out the powers of
the Board of Governors and the Senate. It empowers the Board to
"appoint and to determine the duties of the. . . professors. . . and
from time to make statutes and by-laws for the regulation and
management thereof." On the face of it, each university acting
through its president and board of governors 9 has the power to hire
faculty, to administer the employment relationship and to terminate
faculty, just as any other employer has. Those powers are, of
course, subject to provincial labour standards, workmen's compen-
7. R.S.B.C. 1979, c.419 ; and R.S.A. 1970, c.378 (as am.)
8. S.N.S. 1863, c.23, as am. by S.N.S. 1935, c.104 and 1958, c.121. See also,
for example, University of Manitoba Act, R.S.M. 1970, c.U60 (as am.). Queen's
University is in a somewhat peculiar position, however. Queen's College, now
Queen's University, was established by Royal Charter issued at Westminster in
1841. Subsequently, statutory confirmation, amendments and reconstitutions have
been effected by federal legislation, in particular S.C. 1882, c.123; S.C. 1912,
c. 138. Stuart Ryan has argued, in an unpublished paper on whether Queen's
University is subject to the Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980,
c.224, that these have not really changed the domestic character of the university's
tenure-granting functions which remain unaltered from the original Charter.
Nevertheless, in R. v. Aston University Senate, exparte Roffey, [1964] 2 Q.B. 138
(D.C.), public law remedies were held available with respect to a university
established by Royal Charter and, though criticized subsequently [see Herring v.
Templeman, [1973] 3 All E.R. 569 (C.A.) at 584-585 (per Russell L.J.) and
H.W.R. Wade, Note (1969), 85 L.Q.R. 868 and Administrative Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 4th ed., 1977) at 478-480], it must be regarded as having some
weight. Of course, even if public law remedies are applicable, the Queen's faculty
member contemplating litigation against the University still has a problem.
Because of the federal statutes governing the university's affairs, the Ontario
Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980, v.224, probably does not apply and,
if he wants public law relief, he may have to seek relief from the Federal Court
under either section 18 or 28 of the Federal Court Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1. (The
Federal Court has virtually exclusive judicial review authority with respect to
federal statutory authorities.) On the other hand, if he sues in contract or tort the
courts of Ontario will have jurisdiction.
9. In B.C. by virtue of the Universities Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.419, s.27(f) and
s.56(2) (a).
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sation and similar legislation,1 ° but, with rare exceptions, general
legislation of that sort does not affect academics directly because it
sets minimum standards which even the most put-upon academic
will exceed by a good margin.
What then is the legal nature of the relationship between the
university as employer acting under its governing legislation and its
academic staff, where there is no certified faculty union? The
threshold question is whether the relationship constitutes a contract;
and the crucial issue is whether "tenure" is a purely contractual
notion defined by the private law of contract and the terms of a
contract between the university and its faculty member or a status
akin to that of a "public office" subject to the public law developed
by the courts in relation to office-holders? This uncertainty arises
from, on the one hand, the now statutory basis of all Canadian
universities, accompanied sometimes by a reference to the status of
tenure in the empowering Act itself,'1 and, on the other hand, the
purely contractual features of the relationship, evidenced particu-
larly by dickering over salary and conditions of employment and the
making of "offers of employment" by the university to individual
faculty members. 12
A not unnatural first reaction is to ask whether this distinction
really matters in a practical sense. The answer, quite clearly, is that
it does, although its practical significance has been diminished at
many universities by collective bargaining. 13
10. The law of tort and property, and federal law like the Unemployment Insurance
Act will also be part of the legal employment relationship, in the broadest sense.
See generally, I.M. Christie, Employment Law in Canada (Toronto: Butterworth,
1980).
11. See supra, note 8 and e.g., Universities Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.419, s.28(f),
which gives the Board of Governors of British Columbia universities authority to
fix the tenure of office of professors "which unless otherwise provided shall be
during the pleasure of the board". Compare University of Regina Act, S.S.
1973-74, c. 119, c.62(f), which refers to "terms of office or employment ... which
unless otherwise provided shall be during the pleasure of the board."
12. For a more exteisive discussion of the mixed public and private aspects of
universities generally, see G.H.L. Fridman, "Judicial Intervention Into University
Affairs", supra, note 3, at 181-182.
13. Of course even within collective bargaining regimes certain university faculty
mxa~j be eycluded ftom tbe b atA'g ulait (eag,. embi~xer%- cf tbp- twdicat
faculty at Dalhousie) and they will come within the general law. There may also be
a possibility that general procedural statutes such as the Statutory Powers
Procedure Act (R.J.O. 1980, c.484) will be read into or even prevail over the
collective agreement if a university professor is regarded as a public officeholder.
(This is suggested in an internal CAUT memorandum by Ted Bartley, formerly one
of the Association's professional officers.) At this point, "special plan collective
76 The Dalhousie Law Journal
If a tenured faculty member is a public office holder, dismissal
contrary to the rules of substance or procedure prescribed for or
adopted by his university under its empowering Act may give rise to
typical public law rerfiedies, 14 the effect of which will be
reinstatement to the tenured position, at least until fair procedures
are followed or proper cause is shown. 15 In contrast, if the tenured
faculty member is a mere employee his chances of reinstatement
through the vehicle of a decree of specific performance are very
slim unless, as is happening more commonly nowadays even in
non-collectively organized universities, reinstatement is specifically
provided for as a remedy in the university rules and individual
contracts.' 6 Absent such provision; specific performance is seldom
agreements" should also be noted. See infra, note 75ff. and accompanying text.
14. The most important common law remedies in this area are certiorari and
prohibition. The effect of granting relief in the nature of certiorari is to quash the
dismissal decision, a step which in law means that the successful applicant still is
and always has been a faculty member of the university. Prohibition comes at an
earlier point and, as the name suggests, it operates to prevent the university from
taking a decision contrary to the rules of substance or procedure which govern the
relationship between a university and the faculty member. Also available in some
situations is mandamus, a remedy which compels the university to perform its legal
duty. In both British Columbia and Ontario, by virtue of the Judicial Review
Procedure Acts of those provinces (R.S.B.C. 1979, c.209; R.S.O. 1980, c.224),
these three types of relief are now all sought by a simplified application for judicial
review, while in Quebec certoriari and prohibition since 1965 have been combined
into a single remedy: evocation. See generally D.J. Mullan, Administrative Law
(Toronto: Carswell 2nd ed. 1979) at 197-214 ff.
15. See, however, the discussion below of the Kane case, note 35 and
accompanying text, for a situation in which a successful application for judicial
review did not result in reinstatement. Note also Bellechasse Hospital Corporation
v. Pilotte, [1975] S.C.R. 454, discussed infra at note 139.
16. There is some question whether the courts will give automatic effect to such
attempts at remedy stipulation. Penalty clauses or clauses which seek to enforce
higher than actual loss damages for breach have traditionally been held to be void
as contrary to public policy. It is possible to argue that the same principles which lie
behind this rule will undermine attempts to stipulate for specific performance in
situations where the courts would not generally award it; that it is in the public
interest that the courts (and not the contracting parties themselves) devise remedies
for breach. Nevertheless, such remedy stipulation seems to be accepted where it is
developed in the context of a clause requiring disputes to be submitted to
arbitration, at least where specific performance is specified as an available option
rather than a mandatory remedy, and this, of course, will be the usual situation in
the university context. (See Richard Brown, "Contract Remedies in a Planned
Economy: Labour Arbitration Leads the Way", Chapter 4 in Barry J. Reiter and
John Swan, Studies in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 100-107;
Donald J. M. Brown and David M. Beatty Canadian Labour Arbitration (Toronto:
Canada Law Book Co. 1977 at 64). For general discussion of this issue and the
uncertainties surrounding it, at least outside of the arbitration clause context, see
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available for personal services contracts, damages generally being
regarded as the appropriate remedy. -
7
As a mere employee it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for
a university faculty member to argue for procedural protections,
including the right to a hearing, if the rules of the university do not
make express provision for procedures to be followed. Courts have
not implied procedural requirements into silent contracts of
employment.1 8 As a public office-holder, on the other hand, the
Robert J. Sharpe, "Specific Relief for Contract Breach", Chapter 5 in Studies il
Contract Law, id., at 135-136; Anthony T. Kronman, "Specific Performance"
(1978), 45 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 351 at 370-76; Ian R. MacNeil, "Power of Contract
and Agreed Remedies" (1962), 47 Cornell L.Q. 495 at 520-24; Allan Schwartz,
"The Case for Specific Performance" (1979), 89 Yale L.J. 271 at 273-274.
Surprisingly, specific performance is not even mentioned in the one English-
Canadian article on remedy stipulation: Roger Brownsword "Remedy Stipulation
in l1he English Law of Contract - Fteedom Dx Palenalism!" i19"09), 9 Ott. L.
Rev. 44. Note, however, the judgment ofLaskin, C.J.C., speaking forthe Court in
Red Deer College v. Michaels (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 386 (S.C.C.) at 399, in
which a collective agreement purported to give the court authority to order
reinstatement for a wrongful dismissal:
One thing is certain, the provision in the collective agreement . . . has no effect
on the Court's jurisdiction, it exists without any assistance from a private
agreement.
Finally, for empirical work on the content of appeal and arbitration clauses, see
Campbell, supra, note 3.
17. McWhirter v. Governors of the University of Alberta (No. 2) (1977), 80
D.L.R. (3d) 609 (Alta. S.C., T.D.); (rev'd (but not on this point) (1979), 18 A.R.
145 (S.C.A.D.)) - reflects the generally accepted common law position
established originally in Priestly v. Fowler (1837), 3 M. & W. 1; 150 E.R. 1030.
See also l.B.E.W. Local Union 2085 v. Winnipeg Builders Exchange (196,7), 65
D.L.R. (3d) 242, at 250 (S.C.C.); Red Deer College v. Michaels id., at 400.
However, the attitude of the English courts to the availability of specific
performance, at least at the suit of an employee, seems to be changing: Hill v. C.A.
Parsons & Co. Ltd., [1972] Ch. 305 (C.A.); C. H. Giles and Co. Ltd. v. Morris,
[ 1972] 1 W.L.R. 307 (Ch.D) at 318-319 (per Megarry J.); Price v. Strange, [ 1978]
Ch. 337 (C.A.) at 359-360 (per Goff L.J.), but compare 369 (per Buckley L.J.). It
now seems to be accepted that there is no absolute prohibition against such relief in
personal service situations, though it will require an exceptional case for the
remedy to be awarded. The American courts may indeed have gone even further as
evidenced by the college case ofA.A.U.P. v. Bloomfield College, (1974), 322 A.
2d. 846 (N.J.S.C., Ch.D.) See generally Christie, Employment Law in Canada,
supra, note 10 at 385 ff.
18. So the question in a pure case of master and servant does not at all depend on
whether the master has heard the servant in his own defence; it depends on
whether the facts emerging at the trial prove breach of contract.
Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40 (H.L.(E)), at 65. See also G.
England, "Recent Developments in Wrongful Dismissal Laws and Some Pointers
for Reform" (1978), 16 Alta. L. Rev. 470 at 485fffor a critical evaluation of the
common law position.
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tenured professor, at least to the extent that he can be dismissed only
for cause, has strong legal authority to support an argument for a
hearing before removal from office even when the statute and the
university regulations are silent. 19
Indeed, it is worth noting that there is some support in Canadian
decisions for a measure of implied procedural protection even for
someone who is seeking tenure, as opposed to having it removed. 20
This is further strengthened by the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of
Commissioners of Police in which it was held that implied
procedural fairness obligations may be present in a much wider
range of situations than was previously thought to be the case. 21
There the Court held that a probationary police constable was
entitled, notwithstanding legislative silence, to certain procedural
decencies before he was dismissed. The analogies to the dismissal
of a probationary professor are obvious, and there may also be some
comfort here for those under consideration for tenure.
There may, however, be corresponding difficulties for the
tenured professor viewed as a public office-holder. As such his
claim is to observance of the Act itself and those rules of the
university which have status as subordinate legislation. The
difficulties lie in drawing parallels between a university's rules and
19. Ridge v. Baldwin, id., is the most famous case in support of this proposition.
See also Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1578 (H.L. (Sc)); Re
McCleery and the Queen, [1974] 2 F.C. 339 (C.A.); and Nicholson v.Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police, 11979 1 S.C.R.
311, for some indication that, even where the statutory office is held at pleasure, or
where "cause" need not exist before there is a dismissal, there may in some
situations be implied procedural requirements.
20. See Re Paine and University of Toronto (1980), 115 D.L.R. (3d) 461 (Ont.
H.C., D.C.) (holding the tenure granting process at the University of Toronto to
involve a "statutary power of decision" subject to the procedural obligations of the
Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 484) and Elliot v. Governors of
University of Alberta and Allen, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 195 (Alta. S.C., T.D.).
Contrast, however, Vanek v. Governors of University ofAlberta, [1974] 3 W.W.R.
167 (Alta. S.C., T.D.); aff'd (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 595 (Alta S.C., A.D.). Elliot
is discussed critically by Fridman, "Judicial Intervention Into University Affairs",
supra, note 3 at 182-187 and in "The Nature of a Professional Contract", supra,
note 3 at 19-21, he talks about both Elliot and Vanek.
21. Supra, note 19. In Nicholson the Supreme Court accepted that procedural
fairness claims were not confined, as had been generally thought up until then, to
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies but could also be made with respect to at least some
categories of purely administrative decisions. See D.J. Mullan, "Fairness: The
New Natural Justice?" (1975), 25 U. of T. L.J. 281, cited by Laskin C.J.C. in
Nicholson, at 325.
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regulations and the by-laws of a municipality or regulations
promulgated by Cabinet. If the rules or regulations in question had
been made by the university's central legislative organ, the Board of
Governors or the Senate, the analogy to a municipality's by-laws
would be relatively clear, but a court could regard such rules as
being simply internal rules of the university, not conferring any
judicially enforceable rights .22 With rules not formally promulgated
by the university's central legislative organ this possibility becomes
a likelihood. Indeed this type of reasoning has recently appealed to
the Supreme Court of Canada in the context of prison disciplinary
rules, which the Court refused to categorize as "law" in denying
relief for their non-observance in Marineau and Butters v. Matsqui
Institution Inmate Disciplinary Board (No. 1). 23
To further complicate the picture, there may be other very real
advantages for the tenured faculty member in arguing for tenure as a
contractual concept rather than as a statutory status. If it is
contractual the university may have a much harder job imposing
modifications of tenure on those who already have it. Contracts
cannot be changed unilaterally but statutory authorities are generally
held not to be prevented from exercising their rule-making powers
even in the face of representations to the contrary made to those
affected. 24 In other words if the university is regarded simply as a
22. Wheeldon v. Simon Fraser University (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (B.C.S.C.)
suggests this possibility, although the peculiar facts of the case limit its general
applicability. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
23. [1978] 1 S.C.R. 118. The holding in this case was notwithstanding the fact
that the directives were authorized directly in the empowering Act itself. However,
note Martineau and Butters v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board (No. 2)
(1979), 30 N.R. 119 (S.C.C.), in which the Supreme Court held that it was still
possible for the applicants to argue for a measure of procedural protection on a
common law basis even though the hearing rules were not themselves "law". For a
trenchant criticism of the first decision, see H.N. Janisch, Comment (1977), 55
Can. B. Rev. 576.
24. For a recent discussion of estoppel by representation as it applies generally to
statutory authorities in Canada, see Patrick McDonald, "Contradictory Govern-
ment Action: Estoppel of Statutory Authorities" (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall L.J.
160. A nice problem arises in what is in a sense the converse situation. What if a
university exercises its powers improperly in relation to a faculty member. If the
relationship is merely contractual this may be excused by the faculty membey or be
the subject of settlement or compromise [Dombrowski v. Board of Governors of
Dalhousie University (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 268 (N.S.S.C., T.D.), affd (1976),
79 D.L.R. (3d) 355 (N.S.S.C., A.D.), Ayre v. University of Manitoba (1976), 65
D.L.R. (3d) 747 (Man. C.A.]. If, however, the professor is, viewed as an
office-holder with public law rights, it may be much more difficult for the
University to set up an effective waiver or compromise. Jurisdiction cannot be
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statutory body exercising its statutory power it may be able to
change tenure rules in existence when the tenure in question was
granted and thus affect the legal incidents of tenure for any member
of faculty. On the other hand, if tenure is a purely contractual notion
a change in the rules will at the very least require the consent or
acquienscence of those affected by it. There will have to be
fulfillment of one of the recognized ways of modifying a contract,
considered below, 25 each of which necessarily involves the other
party; who in this case would be the tenured professor or, possibly,
even a person employed on a tenure stream contract subject to
certain existing procedures for tenure consideration.26
Another possible advantage for the faculty member of a purely
contractual analysis relates to the role of the courts. If tenure is a
public statutory office, decisions about it will reach the courts only
in judicial review proceedings, where the courts have very limited
authority to overturn a decision on the merits, their main concern
being procedural deficiencies and lack of jurisdiction.2 7 If tenure is
contractual then the action is not for judicial review but generally
for damages for breach of contract, and in that context the courts are
far more likely to determine the merits. In judicial review
proceedings involving a dismissal for cause the courts would
generally be unwilling to determine whether there was in fact cause.
Provided the decision did not reveal a clear error of law or a totally
unreasonable view of the facts there would be no review of the
merits. In a breach of contract action, on the other hand, the court
would be willing to decide the question aesh, to substitute its ',iew
conferred on a public body by consent, it is sometimes asserted. See J.M. Evans,
de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (London: Stevens, 4th ed.,
1980) at 153-154 and 422-423. However, Ayre may have been decided on public
rather than private law principles. See judgment of Hall J.A. (with which Matas
J.A. concurred) at 752.
25. See infra, notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
26. For American discussion of this doctrine in the tenure context see Ronald C.
Brown, "Tenure Rights in Contractual and Constitutional Context" (1977), 6
Journal of Law and Education 279 at 288-291 and 285-286; Matthew W. Finkin,
"'Contract, Tenure and Retirement: A Comment on Rehor v. Case Western
University" (1975), 4 Human Rights 343.
27. Error of law on the face of the record is a ground of review, absent a privative
clause. Patent unreasonableness and a total absence of evidence to support a
decision may also give rise to judicial intervention. However, those instances
aside, the message of recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions has been that the
courts should be very circumspect in intervening in the merits of statutory
decision-making. See particularly, Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local
963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation (1979), 97 D.L.R. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.).
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of the law and the facts for that of the dismissing university. 28
However, even if the relationship is purely contractual, where the
parties have established their own remedial regime, either in the
form of internal appeal committees or external arbitration, the
courts may be as reluctant to interfere with the disposition of the
matter (particularly in the case of external arbitration) as they are on
judicial review. 29
In sum, from the perspective of the university professor, either
tenured or applying for tenure, sometimes it will be advantageous to
assert one view of the status and sometimes the other. The issue
remains: What is the present Canadian position?
The early Canadian case law in this area, while generally going
against the complaining professor, gives some support to the
proposition that tenured academic employment is a statutory office,
at least in some senses of that word. 30 However, in all but one case,
28. See, for example, Steer J's judgment inMcWhirter v. Governors of University
of Alberta (1975), 63 D.L.R. (3d) 684 (Alta. S.C., T.D.) and the full consideration
he gives both to the meaning of the contract and whether there had in fact been a
breach. Nevertheless, even if tenure is regarded as contractual in nature the scope
for court intervention may narrow considerably where dispute resolution has been
committed to internal university bodies. See infra, notes 35 and 40 and
accompanying text, and McWhirter v. Governors of University of Alberta (No. 2)
(1979), 18 A.R. 149 (A.D.). In an American context, see also Krotkoff v. Goucher
College (1978), 585 F (2d) 675 (4th Circ.) in which the Court adopted a judicial
review, limited intervention stance in a breach of contract action to the College's
determination of a state of financial exigency.
29. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the law relating to judicial
review of statutory authorities (including statutory arbitrations) and that relating to
consensual arbitrations, see the judgment of Estey J. in Douglas Aircraft Co. of
Canada Ltd. v. McConnell (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
30. The six early cases are Ex parte Jacob (1861), 10 N.B.R. 153; Weir v.
Matheson (1866), 3 U.C. E. & A. 123 (Ont.);Re Wilson (1885), 18 N.S.R. 180;In
re University of Saskatchewan and MacLaurin, [1920] 2 W.W.R. 823 (Sask.
K.B.); Craig v. Governors of University of Toronto supra, note 18; Smith v.
Wesley College, [1923) 3 W.W.R. 195 (Man. S.C.). There was than a hiatus of
almost fifty years before the next reported case. The early decisions are well
discussed by Laskin, Soberman, Ouellette, Fridman, Campbell and Ryan, supra,
note 3.
Most strongly supportive of the proposition in the text is Re Wilson in which the
applicant secured mandamus to compel his reinstatement as a professor because his
dismissal had been effected without proper notice and the opportunity to be heard
- the office of professor was stated to be held during good behaviour in the
empowering statute. Weir v. Matheson, in a quite different legislative context, held
clearly that the professor-university relationship was a regular servant-master one.
The other four cases are all complicated by the intrusion of visitorial jurisdiction
and/or the existence of a statutory provision to the effect that professors hold office
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it was a statutory office that accorded very little protection, as it was
generally seen simply as a status held "during the pleasure" of the
governing authorities as opposed to being an office from which the
incumbent could only be removed for cause. This meant that the
courts would not intervene for absence of fair procedures nor would
they scrutinize the merits of the decision in any way, save where
bad faith or corrupt motive was established. 3 '
Support for the point of view that tenure is a statutory office can
also be found in a number of much more recent decisions in which
public law remedies were used either with explicit approval or
without question by the courts to challenge various aspects of
university decision-making, including not only those affecting
tenure and professors generally, but also students. 32 Of special
during pleasure (though for example, in MacLaurin, Craig, and Smith this was
unless otherwise provided by the governing authorities). In Craig, Orde J. (at 321)
was, however, prepared to acknowledge the possibility "that the Board comes
within that class of quasi-public bodies possessing the power of summary dismissal
similar to that possessed by the Crown" but did not feel it was necessary to decide
that point. In Jacob, the Court doubted the availability of certiorari. In Smith, an
action for damages for breach of contract, much emphasis was placed upon the
"private" nature of the institution, a fact that was held to give the college less
latitude than that possessed by the institutions in Jacob, Craig and MacLaurin in
which the contract governed.
31. The relevant statutes in Jacob, MacLaurin, Smith and Craig all contained
wording to this effect. Indeed, such language can still be found in university
statutes to this day. See Universities Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.419, s.28(f) (unless
otherwise provided). In MacLaurin, the judges of the Saskatchewan King's Bench
Division sitting in their visitorial capacity stated (at 827)-.
The statute and the by-laws having, therefore, been complied with, we have, in
our opinion, no power to interfere with what has been done; unless the president
or the governors exercised their discretion of removal in an oppressive manner
or from a currupt or indirect motive.
32. With regard to professors see, for example, Chamberlain v. Board of
Governors of University of Western Ontario, unreported decision of Donnelly J. of
the Ontario High Court, delivered June 27, 1974, holding the dismissal
proceedings brought against Chamberlain to be subject to both review under the
Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 224, and the procedures laid down
in the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.484; Re Brendon and
Board of Governors of University of Western Ontario (1977), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 260
(Ont. H.C.) and particularly Re Paine and University of Toronto, supra, note 20.
With regard to students see Re Schabas and Caput of University of Toronto (1974),
52 D.L.R. (3d) 495 (Ont. H.C., D.C.); Re Polten and Governing Council of
University of Toronto (1975), 59 D.L.R. (3d) 197 (Ont. H.C., D.C.), in each of
which certain university decision-making in relation to students was held to be
subject to review under the Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980,
c.224; King v. University of Saskatchewan, [19693 S.C.R. 678 at 683-684 (per
Spence J.), approving on this point (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 721 (Sask. C.A.) at 723;
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significance is Re Elliot and Governors of University of Alberta, a
1973 decision of the Alberta Supreme Court, Trial Division, in
which Lieberman J. held that the University's faculty tenure
committees and tenure appeals committee, which derived their
authority from the statutorily-designated general faculty council and
Board of Governors, were themselves statutory bodies amenable to
public law remedies .33 Also very important is the recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Kane v. Board of Governors of
University of British Columbia.34 This was a successful application
for judicial review, a public law remedy under the British Columbia
Judicial Review Procedure Act,35 involving an appeal from the
suspension of a tenured faculty member conducted contrary to the
rules of natural justice. In neither the British Columbia courts nor
the Supreme Court of Canada was there ever any suggestion that he
should have been suing for damages for breach of contract rather
than for judicial review.
On the other hand, there have been occasions on which professors
have pursued the regular breach of contract route without objection
by the courts or by the defendant university to the form of the
proceedings. Indeed, in Re Vanek and Governors of University of
Alberta, decided shortly after Elliot, both the trial court judge,
Re Harelkin and University of Regina (1979), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 14 (S.C.C.). It is,
however, interesting to note that in Polten, Weatherston J. suggests that as opposed
to the student matter before the Court, "disputes over tenure or terms of
employment between members of the teaching staff and the university . . . can
probably only be resolVed in an action for breach of contaCt" kid., -at 212). For a
recent Canadian discussion of the issue in a different context, see McCarthy v.
Board of Trustees of Calgary Roman Catholic Schools School District No. I (No.
2) (1979), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 48 (Alta. S.C. T.D.) See also Anderson v. Director
General of Education, [1978] 2 N.J.W.L.R. 423 (Admin. L.D.)
33. Supra, note 20.
34. (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 311 (S.C.C.), reversing (1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d) 726
(B.C.C.A.), which had affirmed (1977), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 494 (B.C.S.C.).
35. S.B.C. 1976, c.2 5 . As noted previously, this statute, as with the Ontario
Judicial Review Procedure Act R.S.O. 1980, c.224, created a new, virtually
comprehensive public law remedy out of a combination of most of the important
common law remedies - certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, declaration and
injunction. Two points deserve to be made about Kane in this regard:
1. Not only did Kane obtain judicial review (the new remedy) from the Supreme
Court of Canada but, when at the lower court levels he was denied relief, it was
on the basis of substance and not because he had sought the incorrect remedy.
2. However, the end result of the case was not a quashing of the suspension itself
but only of the appeal from the suspension. The defect was in the conduct of the
appeal so that Kane's right was to a proper appeal hearing - not to a quashing
of the suspension.
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Cavanagh, J., and Clement J.A. (delivering the judgment of the
Appellate Division) disagreed with Lieberman J. and held that the
faculty tenure committee was not subject to public law remedies
because it was not a statutory body. 36 Subsequently, Steer J., in
McWhirter v. Governors of UJniversity of Alberta (No. 2), approved
this aspect of Clement J.A.'s judgment in Vanek and held that an
applicant for tenure's recourse for failure to follow the rules found
in the Faculty Handbook rested in contract, not public law. 37 In
doing so, he spoke of the distinction between
• ..employment and the resultant status conferred by virtue of a
statute and employment under a contract of employment. In the
former situation, the discharge is a nullity. In the latter situation,
there is never a nullity. If a dismissal is a breach of contract it is
lawful but it can only sound in damages.
38
His Lordship then went on to state that, in exceptional
36. [1974] 3 W.W.R. 167 (Alta. S.C., T.D.) at 170-172, aff'd (1975), 57 D.L.R.
(3d) 595 (Alta. S.C., A.D.) at 600 and 607. Both also held that the appropriate step
in that case was for Vanek to invoke the aid of the university's Visitor rather than
pursuing his grievance through the regular courts. This latter aspect of the decision
was followed by Steer J. in McWhirter v. Governors of University of Alberta,
infra, note 37 (and accompanying text). However, Steer J. did draw a distinction
between allegations of unfairness in the tenure granting process which he held came
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Visitor and other allegations of breach of
contract which were pleaded by the plaintiff. These included such matters as
suppressing his courses and not describing them fully in the calendar.
Subsequently, as a result of the difficulties that were encountered in invoking the
jurisdiction of the Visitor, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province, in Vanek's
case, the Universities Act was amended and the office of Visitor abolished (see
Universities Amendment Act, S.A. 1976, c.88, s.2, amending Universities Act,
R.S.A. 1970, c.378, s. 5). The abolition of the Visitor took place while McWhirter
was on appeal and the Appellate Division sent the case back to Steer' J. for
consideration of the fair procedures issue. The office of Visitor continues to be
retained at many universities across Canada. See Universities Act, R.S.B.C. 1979,
c.419, s.3; Universities of Regina Act, S.S. 1973-74, c.11 9 , s.9. However,
universities in Ontario do not appear to be subject to visitorial jurisdiction. (See,
e.g., Re Polten and Governing Council of University of Toronto, supra, note 32 at
219-20.) For recent discussions of the role of theVisitor, see J.W. Bridge,
"Keeping Peace in the Universities: The Role of the Visitor" (1970), 86 L.Q.R.
531; Yves Ouellette, "Le Contr6le judiciaire sur l'universit6", supra, note 3; W.
H. McConnell, "The Errant Professoriate: An Enquiry Into Academic Due
Process" (1973), 37 Sask. L. Rev. 250 at 250-259 and 277-280; William Ricquier,
"The University Visitor" (1978), 4 Dalhousie L.J. 647; Patel v. University of
Bradford Senate, [19781 3 All E.R. 841 (Ch.D.) (commented on in W.T.M.
Ricquier "Failed Students and Access to Justice", [ 1979] Public Law 209); Riddle
v. University of Victoria (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 164 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd [1979] 3
W.W.R. 289 (B.C.C.A.).
37. (1977), 80 D.L.R. (3d) 609 (Alta. S.C., T.D.) at 616-617.
38. Id., at 617-618.
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circumstances, of which this was not one, reinstatement or specific
performance might be awarded for breach by the employer of a
contract of service. 39 Damages for breach of contract were therefore
awarded but, on appeal, even this was overturned on the basis that
there had not in fact been a failure to follow the rules resulting in a
breach of contract.
40
To this has to be added the further uncertainty resulting from the
fact that tenure and dismissal powers are created in very different
ways in Canadian universities. Sometimes, as with the British
Columbia Universities Act, tenure is given express recognition as a
status in the empowering statute itself.41 In Kane, the power to
suspend which was in issue was specifically conferred by the
statute.42 On other occasions matters of hiring and discipline are
mentioned only in the most general terms by the empowering Act
and left to be filled out by the legislative and executive organs of the
university as they see fit.43 Arguments can therefore be made that
the status of tenure may vary between Canadian universities
depending on whether it is actually created by the empowering
statute itself, in which case it will be a public office, or is left by the
statute to be developed (if at all) at a legislative or executive level,
in which case it will be a creature of contract.
Apart from tenure it seems safe to treat the university
39. Id., at618.
40. (1979), 18 A.R. 149 (A.D.). An interesting aspect of the case is the Court's
unwillingness to interfere with the new way in which the Faculty Tenure
Committee dealt with the evidence. At 155, McGillivray C.J.A. states:
The Faculty and the Board of Governors have agreed upon a Tribunal, chosen
because those persons have a particular expertise and knowledge of the matters
coming before it and their views should not be lightly set aside. This is not a
case where a trial judge has jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between parties -
that is for the forum which they have selected in their agreement.
In terms of previous discussion on this paper, it is interesting to speculate whether
this preference for party-selected modes of dispute resolution would also have led
McGillivray C.J.A. to accept an entitlement to reinstatement if that remedy had
been stipulated and was appropriate. See supra, note 16.
41. R.S.B.C. 1979, c.419, 24(f) (albeit held at pleasure unless the contrary is
provided); University of Waterloo Act, S.O. 1972, c.200, s. 14(1) (b); Wilfred
Laurier University Act, S.O. 1973, c.87, s. 12 (b). The latter two are identified by
Campbell, supra, note 3, and give the Board of Governors power "to grant tenure
to a member of faculty".
42. Universities Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.419, s.58(1). The section then goes on to
provide that the President shall forthwith report the matter to the Board (subs. 2)
and the person suspended then has a right of appeal to the Board.
43. Universities Act, R.S.A., 1970, s. 19.
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employment relationship as one of contract like other employment
relationships. 44 It is perfectly consistent with this that the form
taken by university contracts of employment varies widely. There
need be no single document, nor indeed any document at all. The
contract may consist only in an exchange of letters, or in a
combination of letters and a signed document. There may, of
course, be a single signed document, but most probably there will
be letters, a signed document and other standard documents referred
to in the letter or the formal signed contract. In the common law
provinces other than British Columbia the Statute of Frauds re4uires
that there be a "memorandum or note" of the contract if it is for a
fixed period of longer than one year4 5 but for indefinite hirings,
which would include appointments with tenure, the statute does not
apply and there is no requirement of a signed document at all.
46
Failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds renders a contract
"unenforceable".
The more serious issue is: What terms will be considered to be
incorporated into a contract of employment? The answer is clear
where there is express incorporation, as exemplified by a University
of Alberta contract that was the subject of the Vanek litigation:
All the provisions, terms and conditions set forth in Part I of The
University of Alberta Handbook as amended from time to time
shall apply to and be treated as part of the contract of
appointment. A copy of the Handbook is enclosed herewith and
should be carefully read. 47
44. T'he general proposifion itself has been the subject of academic debate. See
G.H.L. Fridman, "Who is an Employee" (1965), 16 New L.J. II, at 11-12 but the
prevailing view in Canada is that in the private sector the employment relationship
arises out of and is based on contract. See Christie, Employment Law in Canada,
supra, note 10 at 12 and authorities cited there.
45. The ancient English Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c.3, is in force as
received law in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Newfoundland, and in
Prince Edward Island at least insofar as it affects interests in land. Delima v. Paton
(1971), 1 Nfld. and P.E.I. Reps. 317 (P.E.I.S.C.); MacKenzie v. Champion
(1885), 12 S.C.R. 649. The P.E.I. Statute of Frauds, R.S.PoE.I. 1974, c.6 does
not contain the relevant section. New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Ontario have
their own statutes: R.S.N.B. 1973, c. s-14; R.S.N.S. 1967, c.290; R.S.O. 1970,
c.444. In British Columbia prior to March 1981 the archaic Master and Servant
Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 2 34 , s.5 (for one year incorporated as ss. 62-79 of the
Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 19"79, c.107) would appear to have applied
until the enactment of the Employment Standards Act, S.B.C. 1980, c. 10 which
repealed it by s. 107.
46. Cemco Electrical Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Van Snellenberg, [1947] S.C.R.
127; Campbell v. Business Fleets Ltd., [ 1954] 2 D.L.R. 263 (Ont. C.A.).
47. Supra, note 36. The contract is quoted in (1976), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 595, at 597.
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Where there is no such express incorporation the court will be
forced to interpret the words used by the parties in an attempt to give
effect to their apparent intent, bearing in mind that if the contract
lacks essential terms or is too vague it will be void for uncertainty.
On this basis the court may invoke the "officious bystander" test 48
to give the contract business efficacy. 49 That test, somewhat
popularized, involves asking whether, if an officious bystander had
interrupted the parties in the course of their negotiations by saying
"Don't you intend this or that term to be part of your contract?"
they would almost certainly have silenced him with a testy "of
course." 50 In other words, the court will treat the parties as having
intended to draw in at least enough of their past practice and any
documents relating to employment that are public on the campus to
make their apparent contract viable.
Even where the primary contractual documents on their face are
complete enough to constitute a contract, the courts will often be
prepared to attribute to the parties an intent to incorporate by
reference employment-related documents of which they are both
obviously aware. 51 Thus the law allows considerable scope to any
particular judge in the determination of whether or not a given
document will be treated as part of the contract of employment. In
this context Wheeldon v. Simon Fraser University5 2 deserves
attention as a case in which a "statement on academic freedom and
tenure . . . considered acceptable by the acting President of the
University and accepted by a referendum of the Faculty members"
-was held not to be incorporated in the plaintiff's contract of
employment. This conclusion is contrary, it is submitted, to the
readiness of the courts in employment cases generally to treat
relevant documents as incorporated.
The issue in the Wheeldon case was, in fact, more difficult than
the simple one of whether a particular known document was to be
treated as incorporated into a new employee's contract. The
"statement on academic freedom and tenure" had been adopted
after the plaintiff was employed, so, in theory, it could only have
become part of her contract of employment if it could be said that
the contract had been amended or renewed taking the statement into
48. Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries, [1939] 2 K.B. 206.
49. The "Moorcock" (1889), 14P.D. 64(C.A.).
50. Supra, note 48 at 227.
51. Sagarv.Ridehalgh, [1931] 1 Ch. 310 (C.A.)
52. Supra, note 22.
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account. Hinkson J. held, on the evidence, that the Board of
Governors had made it clear that the statement "was not to have any
binding contractual effect in respect to the Faculty Association or
any individual'53 and that the Faculty Association had obtained the
approv-al of its members on that basis.
In determining whether the document was part of Wheeldon's
contract of employment the Faculty Association's perception of its
nature should have been irrelevant. The proper question was
whether, on the evidence, the plaintiff, as a reasonable person,
would have thought that she was being offered an amendment or
renewal of her coritract on terms that included the statement of
tenure and academic freedom. 54 The courts normally do look to the
document to be incorporated to see if it is "appropriate" or
"suitable" for incorporation, but that should not be a question of
the intent with which it was produced but rather a question of
whether it contains terms of a kind that the parties can reasonably be
supposed to have intended to incorporate by reference. 55
The important point is that changed understandings and new
documents relating to the employment relationship can be and are,
almost as a matter of course, treated as being incorporated into
ongoing employment relationships. That, after all, is what happens
every time a new benefit plan is introduced or an employee takes on
new duties. Theoretically, these changes in the contract can be
justified in either of two ways: first, on the basis of a term, usually
implied 56 but sometimes express, to the effect that reasonable
changes can be made by the employer. An example of an express
provision of this kind is that found in the Dalhousie contract of
employment in use several years ago:
I agree to abide by the general terms of academic appointment, as
they are now defined or may in the future be revised by the Board
of Governors of the University. 57
Second, where no such broad term is expressed or can
realistically be implied, as might well be the case where the
53. Id., at 646.
54. We would think it fair to conclude that even by this standard Hinkson J. would
have found against the plaintiff.
55. See supra, notes 46-5 and accompanyingtexl.
56. See M.R. Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford: Clarendon. 1976),
at 42 ff. and Christie, Employment Law in Canada, supra, note 10 at 257-259.
257-259.
57. Quoted in Dombrowski v. Dalhousie College and University (1978), 79
D.L.R. (3d) 355, at 357.
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employee's terms were changed for the worse, the theory is that by
continuing in employment under the changed terms the employee
has manifested his intent to accept them. 58 Legal consideration may
be said to consist in the fact that in exchange the employer has
foregone his right to terminate the employee with due notice.1 In
effect there has been a novation, or new contract.
There is, in other words, ample theoretical basis for treating the
employment relationship as a contract, but normally a changeable
one, 60 although it must be borne in mind that there is an increasing
number of cases in which it has been held that for the employer to
make significant changes in the employment relationship without
the employee's approval by either words or conduct entitles the
employee to quit and bring an action for constructive dismissal.
61
Most employers can avoid this result by giving the same notice of
any significant change in the contract of employment that they
would be obliged by law to give for termination, but a university
dealing with tenured faculty, who can be terminated only for
particular cause and not merely upon reasonable notice, may
confront serious theoretical difficulties similar to that recognized by
Schroeder J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal in K.M.A. v.
Howie.6 2 In that case, because there was a collective agreement
under which the employee was entitled to continued employment
unless he was terminated with just cause or in order of seniority, the
Court held that retaining him in employment did not constitute
consideration flowing from the employer in exchange for the
employee S acpiaze of 2L Zhang fom Vht ms '~in hi Zr~ MP1VY='erA
58. Where the changed terms are to the employee's benefit, consideration for the
new promise from the employer is the employee's foregoing the giving of due
notice, as is his right, and continuing to work: Sloan v. Union Oil Co. of Canada
Ltd., [195514 D.L.R. 664, at 679 (B.C.S.C.).
59. Peerless Laundry and Cleaners Ltd. v. Neal, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 494 (Man.
C.A.);K.M.A. Caterers Ltd. v.Howie, [1968] 1 D.L.R. (3d) 588 (Ont. C.A.),per
Schroeder J.A., at 559.
60. See Freedland, supra, note 56
61. Brown v. Canada Biscuit Co. Ltd., [1935] S.C.R. 212. Such actions for
"constructive dismissal" are being brought with apparently increasing success.
See e.g.,Johnston v. Northwood Pulp Ltd. (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 15 (Ont. H.C.);
O'Grady v. U..C.B.C. (1975), 63 D.L.R. (3d) 370 (B.C.S.C.);Allison v. Amoco
Production Co. (1975), 58 D.L.R. (3d) 233 (Alta. S.C., T.D.); Burton v.
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd., [1976] 4 W.W.R. 267 (B.C.S.C.).
62. Supra, note 59. Labour lawyers will recognize the more fundamental
objection, not adverted to by the Court, that the arrangement in question did not
respect the union's exclusive right to bargain on behalf of employees in the
bargaining unit.
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terms. The same would appear to be the case with a tenured faculty
member, whether his pre-existing right to continued employment
flowed from a collective agreement, a contract or a statutory
instrument. By merely retaining him in employment the university
would give a tenured faculty member nothing to which he did not
already have a right. This suggests that universities cannot make
legally enforceable changes that affect such people adversely unless
there is an advantageous change, such as an increase in salary, made
at the same time.
6 3
In reality, of course, the faculty member faces the difficulty that
if he does not like a change imposed by his employers his only
recourse at common law is to quit and sue for damages for
constructive dismissal, since he probably cannot get specific
performance of his contract of employment. 4 Even then, his
damages may be seriously limited by his obligation to mitigate6 5
and in any event he probably will not want to give up his job. Of
course if the change itself produces a quantifiable economic loss the
faculty incumbent might simply sue for damages.
One final point on the common law contract; the bare terms of the
contract will not only be fleshed out through incorporation by
reference, expressed or implied, but also by interpretation of
ambiguous and "open" terms of the contract, words like "fair",
"usual", or "reasonable", in light of the practices and traditions
which make up the context in which the contract was made. Thus,
for example, it could be argued that a dean's letter advising a new
appointee that he would have a "light" teaching toad or would be
expected to do his "fair share" of committee work would call for
consideration of the practice in that faculty if it were alleged that the
university made a demand which constituted breach of contract. It is
clear that even if that dean, as direct delegate of his Board of
Governors, had statutory power to "determine the course load" of
faculty members, like any other statutarily endowed person, a
municipal corporation, for example, he is bound by contract,
including a contract of employment, in the exercise of that power as
long as the contract was not beyond the power of the person who
made it.6
6
63. See also supra, note 26.
64. See supra, note 17 and accompanying text.
65. Red Deer College v. Michaels, supra, note 16 at 400.
66. See the discussion of this same general point in connection with special plans
infra, notes 76ff. and accompanying text.
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(2) The Collective Bargaining Relationship.
The faculties of some thirty-five Canadian universities, including
the major universities in each province except Alberta, British
Columbia, Ontario and Prince Edward Island, have opted for
collective bargaining under their provincial labour relations
legislation. In Alberta and British Columbia the law has been
amended to make the provincial labour relations legislation
inapplicable to universities.6 7 Discussion of the merits of these
amendments is reserved for the assessment of academic collective
bargaining and its impact on tenure with which this paper
concludes. Ontario is in the list of exclusions only because the
University of Toronto has not gone the statutory collective
bargaining route, but, at least, Carleton, Lakehead, Laurentian,
Ottawa and York have done so. There is now no question that,
where permitted by law, collective bargaining is the pievailing type
of academic employment relationship. Nor is there any real doubt,
notwithstanding an early Alberta decision and the ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court to the contrary, that general labour relations
legislation applies to faculty members as employees of their
67. This was accomplished in Alberta in the course of passage of the 1977 Public
Service Employer Relations Act (S.A. 1977, c.40). That Act, by its own terms,
does not apply to "the board of governors of each university under The Universities
Act while it is acting as the employer of the academic staff as defined in The
Universities Act" nor to "the academic staff as defined in The Universities Act of
each university. (See section 2(1) (a) and Schedule, s.2). Section 11 of that Act
also provides:
III. The Universities Act is amended
(a) as to section 19 by striking out subsection (5) and substituting the
following:
(b) the Alberta Labour Act, 1973 does not apply to the Board or
academic staff.
The effect of this amendment of The Universities Act is unaltered by the new
Alberta LabourRelations Act, S.A. 1980, Bill 79, which by s.2(2) "does not apply
to" I
(c) employers and employees in respect of whom this Act does not apply by
virtue of a provision of another Act.
The reference to the 1973 Act will be deemed to be a reference to the 1980 Act by
virtue of S.L4(l) (b) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 189.
The means of rendering the British Columbia Labour Relations Act inapplicable
appears even more oblique. By the Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act, S.B.C.
1977, c.76, s.38 a new section 80A was added to the Universities Act of British
Columbia. Now appearing as R.S.B.C. 1979, c.419, s.80, it provides simply:
80. The Labour Code of British Columbia does not apply to the relationship of
the employer and employee between the university and faculty members.
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universities in Canada. 68
The incidents of the collective bargaining relationship are, in
brief: (i) certification or voluntary recognition of a union as the
exclusive bargaining agent of employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit, which has generally been held to include all faculty
of lecturer rank and above;69 (ii) an obligation on both the certified
or recognized union and the university to bargain in good faith; (iii)
where bargaining is successful, a collective agreement which is
binding on the collective parties, that is, the union and the
university, and on each individual in the bargaining unit; (iv)
arbitration as the means of ultimately settling disputes arising under
the collective agreement; (v) a duty of fair representation on the
union; 70 and (vi) the right to strike or lockout when no collective
agreement is in force and after government conciliation services and
statutory waiting periods have been exhausted.
In a collective bargaining relationship the duties and obligations
of the university and the faculty members are those set out in the
collective agreement, which will be a single document except where
it has been specifically amended by the parties or elaborated through
letters of understanding, which are technically part of the collective
agreement. The collective agreement will be interpreted by labour
68. See National Union of Public Employees, Local 862 v. Board of Industrial
Relations (1963), 43 W.W.R. 560 (Alta. S.C., T.D.), which was based on the
notion that collective bargaining was inconsistent with the statute which put power
to regulate the affairs of the university, including the terms and conditions of
employment of faculty members, in the hands of the Board of Governors. In
N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University (1980), 100 S.Ct.856, on the other hand, the
Supreme Court of the U.S. emphasized the collegial nature of academic
employment, which in the opinion of the majority, made faculty members
managers. Neither view is shared by labour relations boards in Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, ,'here university
faculty are certified, nor by the courts in British Columbia and New Brunswick.
See Re Labour Relations Board and A.G. of B.C.; Re Simon Fraser University
(1966), 57 W.W.R. 504 (B.C.S.C.) and Faculty Association of the University of
St. Thomas v. St. Thomas University (1975), 60 D.L.R. (3d) 176 (N.B.S.C.,
A.D.).
69. Except in the case of Osgoode Hall Law School at York University and
University of Manitoba.
70. Canadian courts have been prepared to imply such a duty under provincial
labour relations legislation. See Fisher v. Pemberton (1969), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 521
(B.C.S.C.); Binder v. Halifax County Municipal School Board (1978), 84 D.L.R.
(3d) 494 (N.S.S.C., A.D.), at 504. British Columbia and Ontario labour relations
legislation explicitly imposes a duty of fair representation on unions: Labour Code
of British Columbia, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.212, s.7; The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O.
1970, c.232, ss.60 and 60a, as am. by S.O. 1975, c.76, s. 16.
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arbitrators with reference to an estabished jurisprudence of labour
arbitration, and the tradition of labour arbitration would suggest a
greater sympathy to the customs and practices of the particular
employment situation than would normally be found in the courts.
That does not mean the formality and precision of the collective
agreement should or will give way in the face of evidence of a
different pre-certification approach, but with sensitive arbitrators a
"common law of academe" 71 may emerge to which reference may
be had where the collective agreement is "open" or ambiguous.
In Re University of Ottawa and Association of Professors at the
University of Ottawa72 arbitrator S.J. Frankel quoted the classic
statement of Professor Bora Laskin (as he then was) in the
Peterboro Locke case:
The introduction of a collective bargaining regime involves the
acceptance by the parties of assumptions which are entirety alien
to an era of individual bargaining. Hence, any attempt to measure
rights and duties in an employer-employee relations by reference
to pre-collective bargaining standards is an attempt to re-enter a
world which has ceased to exist.
73
The arbitrator then went on to say:
The advent of collective bargaining in the university sector
engenders a qualitative change in the relationships of the
professoriate to the university. It may well be that the notion of
the university as a collegial community of scholars was never
more than an ideal, and that the reality was more like that of a
community based on a benevolent but hierarchial paternalism. Be
that as it may, it was possible in such a community, not regulated
by a written code, to have a good deal of flexibility - whether
for good or for ill. With formalized collective bargaining, even
the fiction of collegiality must give way to a legally defined
employer/employee relationship, the details of which are
embodied in the collective agreement . . . the employer has
agreed that in certain personnel areas . . . it would be bound by
the decisions of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Board of
Governors. These decisions cannot be arbitrary or capricious,
they must conform to the provisions of the collective agreement.
They are ultimately subject to review in accordance with
procedures set out in the collective agreement.
74
7 1. Weisberger, Grievance Arbitration in Higher Education: Recent Experiences
with Arbitration in Faculty Status Disputes (1978), at 12.
72. (1978), 20 L.A.C. (2d) 132.
73. Peterborough Locke Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1954), 4 L.A.C. 1499, at 1502.
74. Supra, note 72 at 140.
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(3) "Special Plans".
At the universities in Alberta and at University of British Columbia
and Simon Fraser the statutory amendments precluding collective
bargaining under provincial labour relations legislation have not led
to a return to the traditional "contract-statute" type of relationship.
At those universities faculty employment is now governed by what
the C.A.U.T. refers to as "special plans." ' 75 Essentially, the
Faculty Association negotiates a "structural" agreement with the
university which contains many of the non-monetary aspects of a
standard collective agreement. The agreement also provides for the
annual negotiation of salary and benefits, with some form of
arbitration replacing the right to strike in the event of an impasse at
the bargaining table.
The same suggestion made in respect of collective bargaining -
that the statutory mandate of a university's Board of Governors and
officers does not permit them to "abdicate" the function of setting
terms and conditions of academic employment - has been made in
relation to the commitment to arbitrate under special plans. The
issue has not been decided directly by any Canadian court but it
would appear that the reasoning of the courts which have upheld
collective bargaining by Canadian universities is applicable. In both
the Simon Fraser case and the St. Thomas case 76 the courts relied on
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in I.B.E.W., Local
No. 1432 v. Summerside and A.G.P.E.I. 7 7 where Ritchie J. ruled
that the Town of Summerside could exercise its statutorily bestowed
powers to make by-laws respecting employment and to hire people
in a manner consistent with its obligations to make binding
collective agreements. By the same token, to enter a special plan
with an arbitration provision is not to abdicate from or act contrary
to such powers but to exercise them. It might also be noted in
passing that in dealing with its non-academic employees a
university is acting under the same or similar statutory powers. It
would be a surprising conclusion indeed that a university could
bargain collectively but is precluded from adopting arbitration as a
means of peacefully settling its labour disputes.
It does not matter particularly what the "special plan"
arrangement is called; it may be part or all of the faculty handbook
75. See supra, note 1.
76. See supra, note 68.
77. (1960), 23 D.L.R. (2d) 593, at 601.
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or simply identified as an agreement between the faculty association
and the university. It may have virtually all the terms of a
full-fledged collective agreement, or it may be quite limited. At
Calgary, for instance, it applies only to the negotiation of the
monetary package. Other aspects of the employment relationship
there are governed by common law contract, most of the terms of
which are to be found in a faculty handbook unilaterally
promulgated by the employer.
Note that the critical distinction between a "special plan", as the
term is used here, and a simple contract-statute relationship is that
the former is negotiated with the faculty association and may be
enforced by the faculty association.
While the Alberta universities have turned to "special plans"
because collective bargaining is unavailable, the faculties of the
University of Toronto and University of Prince Edward Island have
adopted them as a matter of choice. 78 Legally, the situation is the
same, except that if the aim is not to have a true collective
agreement it is important, in provinces where faculty bargaining
could be carried on under the labour relations legislation, to make
sure by specific wording that acceptance of the "special plan" does
not constitute voluntary recognition of the faculty association as a
union. If it does then the "special plan" will not only look like a
collective agreement, it will be a collective agreement! There is, of
course, another very important difference between "special plans"
in Alberta and British Columbia and those elsewhere. Elsewhere, if
there is any poblem with enforcement or if there is an ultimate
impasse in negotiating the structural agreement faculty can always
seek certification. That may be perceived by the university
administration as a real threat, perhaps even a more effective threat
than the threat of strike itself.
What then is the legal nature of these "special plans"? In a
nutshell, they have about the same effect in law as collective
agreements did before the advent of modem collective bargaining
legislation. If either party must resort to law to enforce such a plan
there will undoubtedly be problems. 79 The issues are not easily
compressed. 80 The question of enforceability must be addressed on
both the collective and individual levels.
78. At U.B.C. the choice of a "special plan" preceeded the B.C. legislative
amendment.
79. Young v. Canadian Northern Railways, [1931] 1 D.L.R. (645) (P.C.)
80. For a fully elaborated legal opinion see B.G. Hansen, The Status of the Alberta
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On the collective level the threshold problem for enforcement by
the faculty association is that, absent the effect of the labour
relations legislation, the association itself may not be a legal entity,
unless it is registered under the provincial societies act or
incorporated. Once this hurdle is cleared the next one is the question
whether the "special plan" will be held to have been made with the
requisite "intention to create legal relations" to make it an
enforceable contract. "Pre-labour relations legislation" agreements
were held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to be
unenforceable on that basis, 81 but that hurdle too can be cleared if
the university and the faculty association insert in the plan a clause
to the effect that it is intended to be legally binding. However, most
such plans provide that the agreement is to be enforced by an
arbitration mechanism, and, since at the time of signing neither
party is likely to have contemplated any unwillingness to comply
with an arbitrator's order, it may be difficult to get a mutual
statement of legal enforceability beyond that. Moreover, as has
already been pointed out, there could be some difficulty with the
specification of remedies other than damages. 
82
Also at the collective level, because labour relations legislation
does not apply there is no legal obligation to bargain in good faith
and thus nothing to preclude either party from taking the stance
upon renegotiation of the basic or "structural" agreement that a
new topic is simply not negotiable. This lends added significance to
the fact that in British Columbia and Alberta faculty will not be able
to force negotiations through strike action unless they are prepared
to do so without the protections afforded to trade unions and their
members by the unfair labour practice provisions of labour relations
legislation. Without those protections faculty unions and their
leaders might well be successfully sued and striking faculty
members would probably be subject to discharge for breach of their
contracts of employment.
83
Faculty Associations under the Public Service Employee Act A Report to the
Alberta Affiliates of CAUT (1978).
81. Young v. Canadian Northern Railways, supra, note 79.
82. See supra, note 16.
83. In other words the union and its leaders might well be liable for inducing
breaches of the faculty members' contracts of employment and they, and the
faculty members themselves, might be liable for inducing breaches of other
contracts to which the university was party and which could not be performed
because of the strike - most obviously the university's contracts with its students,
but also research contracts and the like. Quite possibly the tort of intimidation,
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Strikes at "special plan" universities in other provinces give rise
to a different set of legal problems. Essentially, where universities
and their employees are subject to provincial labour relations
legislation the union would face the added difficulty that the union
itself, its officers and members would be involved in an illegal
strike because the labour relations legislation of every province
provides that those to whom it applies cannot strike unless, to begin
with, a union has been certified on their behalf. The individual
union members would have the protection of the provincial labour
relations legislation, to the extent that their illegal strike would not
of itself terminate the employment relationship, but that would not
prevent the employer from dismissing them for cause; that is for
participating in an illegal strike.
The right of an individual faculty member to enforce the terms of
a "special plan" in the courts is dependent on whether or not its
terms can be said to be incorporated into his private contract of
employment. The common law applies, so this will depend on the
terms of his contract. 84 If the "special plan" contains arbitration
provisions the faculty member will be able to have his grievance
taken to arbitration by the association. Moreover, the "special
plan" may provide that some, or possibly all, types of grievance
can be taken to arbitration by an individual employee. If not, the
faculty member will be more at the mercy of his union (the faculty
association) than if collective bargaining legislation applied, for it is
difficult to see that the association would owe him any duty of fair
representation such as that expressed or implied in provincial labour
relations legislation.8 5
If a "special plan" provided for arbitration and the employer
refused to comply with an arbitrator's award (which would be
unlikely), the employee could either rely on the faculty association
to enforce the award by bringing an action on the contract to his
benefit,86 which would be subject to the difficulties of enforcement
at the collective level already referred to, or he would have to rely
on his individual contract of employment, treating the "special
intentional interference with economic advantage or tortious conspiracy could give
rise to actions against the union and its officers. (See I.M. Christie, The Liability of
Strikers in the Law of Tort (1967), and Tacon, Tort Liability in a Collective
Bargaining Regime (1980).
84. See supra, notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
85. See supra, note 70 and accompanying text.
86. Beswick v. Besvick [1968] A.C. 58 (H.L.(E).
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plan" terms, including the arbitrator's award, as incorporated by
reference. 
87
All of this is, of course, "lawyer talk". The "special plan" may
be entirely satisfactory where, from the outset, it is broad in scope
and based on a solid relationship between the university and the
faculty association, so that the association and its members are not
presented with problems of enforcement or lack of good faith in
negotiations.
III. Significant Employment Issues in the Contract-Statute Context
Tenure is probably the most significant employment issue in the
traditional academic employment relationship but others, relating to
hiring and the obligation of the parties to one another, are also
important.
(1) Hiring.
The major legal consideration in the context of hiring is the
avoidance of discrimination contrary to provincial human rights
legislation. This does not differ, essentially, whether there is a
contract-statute, "special plan" or collective bargaining relation-
ship. A collective agreement will probably reiterate or incorporate
the "no discrimination" provisions of the provincial legislation,
which simply means the employer may face a grievance as well as a
complaint to the human rights commission. As well, according to
the recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bhadauria v.
Seneca College98 there may be a civil suit based on the tort of
discrimination.
The issue of discrimination is not, of course, confined to hiring.
It relates to all aspects of the employment relationship, including
promotion, tenure and termination. Allegations of differential
treatment of female faculty members and problems with compulsory
retirement will probably loom large in university employment
relationships of all kinds.
In all provinces, other than Alberta and British Columbia, where
the labour relations legislation does not apply to academic
87. He probably would have little difficulty in persuading the court to treat the
terms of the arbitrator's award as incorporated but might be unable to get specific
performance (see supra, note 16). Particularly in the case of a denial of promotion,
denial of tenure or discharge damages would be unlikely to be a satisfactory
remedy.
88. (1980), 105 D.L.R. (3d) 707 (Ont. C.A.).
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employment in universities it would, of course, be an unfair labour
practice for a university to refuse to hire a person because of his
union activities 89
Finally in the context of hiring, disregard for the proper
functioning of arrangements for peer evaluation could give rise to
difficult problems. A prospective appointee would have no basis for
any action, except possibly if the process were to be considered
statutory. Under a "special plan" the faculty association might be
able to grieve and proceed to arbitration, although, of course, the
ultimate enforceability of the arbitrator's order in specific terms
would be doubtful. 90 Under a collective agreement, on the other
hand, it would probably be quite clearly provided that the union had
the right to bring a policy grievance, or grievance on behalf of the
applicant, that could result in an enforceable order by an arbitration
board to hire the applicant, or, more likely, to go through the
procedure properly.
(2) Employer Obligations.
The general problem with employer obligations is one of remedy.
Even if the various obligations of the university to its academic
employees are spelled out clearly - and often they are not - in the
absence of an explicit right to specific performance, and perhaps
even in the face of such remedy specification, the only remedy
readily available in the courts is damages. 91 Realistically, therefore,
in the university employment context as in any other unless the
employee has access to a grievance procedure he vWill probably not
go to law to try to enforce his employment rights. He will complain
and fuss and eventually seek another job if he can find one. Only if
89. A person who was refused employment on such grounds might have a neat (but
probably ineffective) argument to make before the British Columbia Labour
Relations Board, to the effect that his complaint was not about a matter within "the
relationship of employer and employee between a university and [one of] its faculty
members" and therefore that section 80 of the Universities Act, R.S.B.C. 1979,
c.419 did not apply to preclude the application of theLabour Code in the case of a
refusal to hire. A similar argument would not appear to be available under the
Alberta legislation. For the relevant legislation, see supra, note 67.
90. What would be being enforced would be the Special Plan itself so, assuming
the association was a legal entity, the serious question would be one of intention to
create legal relations. See supra, note 78, and accompanying text. If that
requirement were satisfied, the arbitrator's award would be like any other contract
but the court might balk if the effect of enforcing the arbitrator's award was to
specifically enforce an employment arrangment. See supra, note 16.
91. See supra, note 16 and accompanying text.
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he can maintain that the university in effect forced him to quit in
failing to fulfill its obligations to him will he have a remedy in the
form of an action based on constructive dismissal.
Problems of uncertainty of terms and lack of an adequate remedy
can arise in relation to a broad range of matters, from sabbaticals to
the provision of support facilities, such as the right to have the use
of a private telephone, the guarantee of a private office or adequate
research facilities and library support. These are matters that may or
may not be dealt with specifically in a "special plan" or collective
agreement, but they are matters about which a faculty union can
insist on negotiations and about which it will probably in the end get
clear terms that are enforceable by grievance and arbitration if it
comes to that.
More serious will be issues relating to re-appointment and
promotion. Like tenure, in the traditional contract-statute setting
these matters are usually addressed by the university's "legisla-
tion" and both substantive and procedural arrangements are
frequently set out in faculty handbooks, and they are virtually
always covered by "special plans" and collective agreements. Our
discussion of the legal nature of tenure is, therefore, generally
applicable to procedures for promotion or re-appointment. Whether
they are "statutory" or "contractual" matters is similarly
uncertain. 92
The pervasive employer obligation in this context is the guarantee
of academic freedom. To some, academic freedom means the right
to think what they wish to think and to write and say in the
classroom and elsewhere, what they think to be true, within the
limits of the laws of libel and slander, without fear that their
employment situations will be adversely affected. To others it
apparently extends to the right to decide what to teach, how to
teach, how to examine, the right to be involved in collegial
decision-making and to be the subject thereof, in all aspects of one's
academic career. 93 Small wonder then that allegations of
infringements upon academic freedom are loud and frequent.
Faculty handbooks often contain some statement 94 and where there
92. See supra, notes 11-43 and accompanying text. And fns. 97 ff and
accompanying text, infra.
93. Vancouver City College and the Faculty Association of Vancouver City
College (Langra), [1974] 1 Canadian L.R.B. Reps. 298 (B.C.L.R.B.).
94. See the CA UT Handbook, (ed. W. Goode) (Ottawa: CAUT, 3rd ed., 1979).
The guidelines therein have been adopted at least in part by many universities.
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is a "special plan" or a collective agreement it will almost certainly
include a statement of academic freedom, probably based on the
model clause in the CAUT Handbook. 95 Such statements,
although broad, have the great advantage of introducing some
degree of specificity into this aspect of the relationship.
(3) Employee Obligations.
Every bit as nebulous as the obligation of the university to ensure
the academic freedom of its employees are their obligations to their
employer. Indeed, it may well be precisely because of the uncertain
limits of academic freedom that there is so much uncertainty about
employee obligations. At common law an employee is obliged to
obey the lawful orders of his employer9" with regard to any task
within the scope of the job for which he was hired. In employment
generally, the common law has become more sensitive to the
employee's position, to the point where deliberate breaches of an
employer's order will not justify dismissal if the employee appears
to have had some real justification for thinking that he was not
obliged to obey. 9 7 What then is the basic obligation of the academic
as employee?
Surely the trade-off for the quite unusual freedom involved in an
academic employment relationship is a legitimate expectation on the
part of the university that its academic employees will conscienti-
ously fulfill the purpose of the university "in the search for
knowledge, in the communication of knowledge to students,
colleagues and society at large." 98 Ideally what is involved is a
commitment to those purposes on the part of the faculty member to
the same degree that the university is expected to be committed to
the ideals of academic freedom. Of course legally enforceable
norms very often, and perhaps properly, fall far below the ideals!
The employment obligations of the academic are commonly
broken down into four: to teach, to research and publish the results
thereof, to do his share in the decision-making and administration of
95. Id.
96. Robinson v. Estella Mines Ltd. (1953), 10 W.W.R. (N.S.) 374 (B.C.S.C.);
Lucas v. PremierMotors Ltd., [1928] 4 D.L.R. 526 (Alta. C.A,); and see Christie,
Employment Law in Canada, supra, note 10 at 274 ff.
97. Laws v. London Chronicle Ltd., [1959] 2 All E.R. 285 (C.A.), and see
Freedland, The Contract of Employment (1976), at 217. Citation (Oxford:
Clarendon 1976).
98. From the first Dalhousie Collective Agreement, article 3.01.
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the university and to serve the public as he is fitted to do by his
special training, knowledge and academic freedom. Just as the
implied obligations of employees in general have been worked out
by the courts in the context of dismissal cases so have these
obligations of the academic been elaborated in tenure cases. 99 But
the acquisition of tenure does not in any way lessen the academic's
obligations, though abuse of tenure may, all too often, lead to a
lessened effort.
Gross failure to meet his obligations may, of course, result in the
dismissal of a tenured faculty member, and there are good reasons
why if tenure is to serve its purposes the failure must, indeed, be
gross. It is not, however, legally correct to say that the faculty
member's obligation is to only meet the minimum required to avoid
dismissal. In the context of a "special plan" or a collective
agreement this may be spelled out.
(4) Tenure and Termination.
The main concern here is with the substantive law relating to tenure.
The procedural or due process questions have been canvassed
elsewhere, 100 so only passing reference will be made to them.
There is much uncertainty surrounding the grounds upon which
tenure can be granted and taken away. Key criteria such as
"research", "cause", "financial exigency" and "program
redundancy" have no generally-accepted meaning. Sometimes the
relevant university regulations or provisions in a collective
agreement attempt to define them with some measure of precision
but clearly not with total success. Not uncommonly these words
simply stand on their own. While it has been argued that procedural
protections are not of much use where there is no precision in these
criteria to which evidence and arguments must be addressed, and
while, obviously, a hearing can be more efficiently conducted if the
issues are narrow and well-defined, procedures do advance other
values. To the extent that they achieve open decision-making they
serve as a check not only on arbitrary and malicious behaviour, but
also on unthinking and inconsistent decisions. This is particularly so
if the procedures include an obligation to give reasons, a
99. See infra, notes 100 ff. and accompanying text.
100. See D.J. Mullan, "The Modem Law of Tenure" in The University and the
Law (ed. H.N. Janisch) (Dalhousie Continuing Legal Education Series, No.
8,1975); at 102.
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requirement which also has the potential to provide definition to
uncertain criteria such as "cause", "research" and "financial
exigency." The more these terms are thought about and applied
openly in particular cases the sooner they will come to have an
accepted and relatively definite meaning.
There is some comfort in the fact that, prompted by bodies such
as CAUT, faculty associations and various university commit-
tees, universities have moved during the last five years to accept not
only greater openness in tenure decision-making, but also in many
instances external review in the form of binding arbitration. There
are severe dangers in over-judicializing the system, of opening the
doors to lawyers, but some of those costs are well worth it when the
interests affected are very important and when the standards to be
applied are susceptible to vast interpretative differences. The
channelling function of procedures where the substantive law is
unclear should not be underrated.
Turning now to the substantive law relating to tenure, doubits
about its legal nature must be reiterated, and it must be
acknowledged that whether tenure is to be viewed as a public office
or as a purely contractual status by no means settles all of its legal
incidents. Nevertheless, whichever way it is categorized, it has
certain commonly accepted features.
The early Canadian court decisions on tenure inclined to hold that
university professors, whether viewed as public office-holders or
not, could, irrespective of rank and length of service, be dismissed
at any time. This was bolstered in most instances by statutory
provisions to the effect that, unless otherwise specified, professors
held their positions "at pleasure". 101 In other words, whatever the
understandings that may have existed among university teachers,
whatever the informal talk of tenure or permanence, the concept
really had no clear legal acceptance at all. To quote Orde J. in the
1923 decision of Craig v. Governors of the University of Toronto:
I am unable to see how evidence that the Board had in fact always
treated its appointments as life-appointments, or that other
universities have done so, could curtail the powers vested in the
Board. 102
101. Supra, notes 30 and 31.
102. (1923), 53 O.L.R. 312, at 320. In dealing with the argument that Craig had
an appointment for life subject to good behaviour and continued ability to perform
his duties, His Lordship stated, at 319;
This is surely a startling proposition, and Mr. Arnold, was unable to give me
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Indeed, he was not moved from this position by a statement of the
President to the applicant in the letter of appointment that it was to
be "permanent." 0 3
Since 1923, things have changed radically. Even outside of
collective bargaining, virtually all university regulations have
become much clearer as to the legal existence of tenure; 10 4 contracts
with tenure are very commonly made expressly with professors;'0 5
courts in the United States have clearly recognized tenure as a legal
creature. 10 6 Notwithstanding Orde J.'s reluctance in Craig to use
custom as a springboard for the recognition of a legal right, it is
reasonably clear that today the prevalence of tenure and the near
universal acceptance of its importance in the academic community
would give it some substantive legal content (notwithstanding the
1975 judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Red Deer
College v. Michaels and Finn).'0 7 This would be true even in
any authority for it. I think the argument can be met very easily if we keep in
mind that, if this contention were correct, the contract for a life-appointment
must necessarily be mutual. It could not be binding on the University without at
the same time binding the professor. And it would be rather disturbing to the
whole professorial body, if it were suggested that, upon an appointment not
limited as to time, none of them could after due notice, without the consent of
his employer, accept a more remunerative offer of employment either in some
other university or elsewhere without committing a breach of contract involving
liability to heavy damages. It should be only necessary to state this contention to
show its absurdity.
Note, however, the rejection of the mutuality argument in A.A.U.P. v. Bloomfield
College, supra, note 17 at 859-60.
103. Id., at 320-321.
104. A good example in a university without collective bargaining is provided by
the October, 1979, Queen's University Regulations Governing Appointment,
Renewal of Appointment, Tenure and Termination for Academic Staff, approved by
the Board of Trustees after an extensive drafting exercise by the Senate and a
committee of Senate.
105. Generally evidenced by a formal offer or letter of appointment from the
University Principal or President at the successful conclusion of the tenure
consideration process.
106. See, in particular, W.S. Griggs and H. W. Rubin, "Legal Ramifications of
the Tenure Crisis" (1977), 6 (2) Journal of Collective Negotiations 119; Alan A.
Matheson, "Judicial Enforcement of Academic Tenure: An Examination" (1975),
50 Washington L. Rev. 597; Ronald C. Brown, "Tenure Rights in Contractual and
Constitutional Context", supra, note 26.
107. Supra, note 16. Here two "tenured" faculty members recovered damages for
wrongful dismissal. They also contended that they should be treated as though they
had never been dismissed because the procedures laid down in the collective
agreement were not followed, i.e., they should be given salary up to the date of the
trial and be declared still to be members of the College's teaching faculty. Laskin
C.J.C. for a number of reasons held that this was not appropriate.
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relation to situations where there were no formal rules; where, as
happened in many institutions until comparatively recently, a
faculty member was simply told by the university, in effect, "If
things work out in the next couple of years, you can stay
permanently. " 108
Most frequently tenure is defined as the right to employment at a
university until the specified retirement age (though this qualifica-
tion is now under some attack) unless the university has or
establishes "cause" to dismiss.' 0 9 Stated in this form, it is a
deceptively comforting concept. The extent of the deception only
I. The collective agreement had expired.
2. It was a consernsual rather than statutory arrangement anyway (i.e., it was
not governed by the Alberta Labour Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 196).
3. The Laiutiff% bad net atteted to iwt\'ke tbe potect-at af the eattetCi'e
agreement procedures before coming to court.
It was also clear that "tenure" was not used in the agreement in its regular sense in
that the College seemed to have the option not to renew an appointment before the
beginning of any following contract year. Laskin C.J.C. did, however,
acknowledge (at 400) the possibility of reinstatement in a breach of personal
services contract action (relying on Hill v. C.A. Parsons & Co. Ltd., supra, note
17) although in this case there was a lack of subsisting confidence between employer
and employee. He also commented that reinstatement was for the court to decide
upon and could not be forced upon it as a remedy. (The collective agreement
provided for court-ordered reinstatement in the event of breach) (at 399). (See
supra, note 16).
108. Of course, if not in writing difficulties may arise. See the consideration of the
various provincial Statutes of Frauds, supra, notes 45 and 46 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of informal or de facto tenure in the United States context,
see Alan A. Matheson, "Judicial Enforcement of Academic Tenure: An
Examination" supra, note 106 at 598-599; Matthew W. Finkin, "Toward a Law of
Academic Status" (1972-73), 22 Buffalo Law Rev. 575, at 592-597; Ronald C.
Brown, "Tenure Rights in Contractual and Consitutional Context" supra, note 26
at 281-282. The leading authority is Perry v. Sindermann (1972), 408 U.S. 593.
109. For a discussion of the definition of tenure, see Ronald C. Brown, "Tenure
Rights in Contractual and Constitutional Context", id., at 280-281. The CAUT
Handbook, supra, note 94 provides a couple of definitions. In its Primer on Tenure
at 2 the following statement appears: -
A professor who has been granted tenure has an appointment without term,
which may be terminated only through resignation, retirement or dismissal for
good reasons as established by a proper hearing.
Then Clause 11(8) of the Policy Statement on Academic Appointments and Tenure
defines "tenure" (at 9): -
... permanency of appointment, the right of a faculty member not to be
dismissed except for cause. Permanency of employment includes the right
during the appointment to fair consideration for increase of responsibility and
salary, and promotions in rank.
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becomes apparent once the vagueness of the "cause" qualification
is understood.
At first blush, "cause" might be thought to involve such conduct
as gross moral turpitude, participation in criminal activities,
persistent failure to fulfill reasonable teaching and administrative
demands and perhaps physical or mental incapacity. 110 This is
certainly consistent with the common law notion of cause for
dismissal, which must be found in the conduct of the employee, not
the economic needs of the employer.111 It must be borne in mind,
110. "Cause" in the sense of personal misconduct may not be as norrowly
circumscribed as is generally supposed. Residual management rights have recently
been exercised at a then non-unionized Maritime university to remove a tenured
faculty member for personal conduct seemingly amounting to far less than the kind
of blameworthiness normally associated with cause in its sense of matters personal
to the individual viz. insufficient research in a faculty where a premium had always
been placed on teaching; lack of attendance during the summer months where, until
a year previously, absences during such times were generally accepted and only
one warning had been given.
At Laurentian University an even more troubling situation developed recently as
the University attempted to put in train procedures for considering the removal of
tenure from a faculty member because she was suing a student for libel. The facts
are detailed in Laurentian University Faculty Association v. Laurentian University
of Sudbury, [19791 O.L.R.B. Rep. 767, in which the Ontario Labour Relations
Board held that the attempt to reconsider tenure during a period when the Faculty
Association had applied for certification was a breach of section 79 of the Labour
Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.228 (a provision, in effect, preventing the parties
changing the employment relationship during the certification proceedings) and the
University was ordered to reinstate. The Board was not, however, concerned with
the general propriety or legality of suich a mt,'-e by the UXniversity.
For a recent discussion of the parameters of "cause", see Note, "Dismissing
Tenured Faculty: A Proposed Standard" (1979), 54 New York University L.R.
827. See also Comment, "Developments - Academic Freedom" (1967-68), 81
Harvard L.R. 1045 at 1094-99; Alan A. Matheson, "Judicial Enforcement of
Tenure: An Examination", supra, note 106 at 604-607. An interesting Australian
case is Orr v. University of Tasmania (1957), 100 C.L.R. 526, in which the
grounds for dismissal were seduction of a student. The court held that there was
ample evidence that this constituted cause and that even though "cause" was not
mentioned in the statute it was nevertheless a proper basis for dismissal. In other
words, in the face of cause a university professor could not rely upon a tenure until
retirement age provision. See also Robertson v. North Island College Technical &
Vocational Institute (1980), 119 D.L.R. (3d) 17 (B.C.C.A.) in which it was held
that a disagreement between a teacher and a headmaster of a school over issues of
policy did not in the circumstances constitute cause. This decision has potentially
important ramifications for the scope of "cause".
Ill. Gillespie v. Bulkley Valley Forest Industries Ltd. (1973), 39 D.L.R. (3d)
586, at 589, aff d 50 D.L.R. (3d) 316 (B.C.C.A.) is a recent decision confirming
this long established proposition. See generally, Christie, Employment Law in
Canada, supra, note 10 at 362 and the cases cited there.
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however, that the general law of wrongful dismissal has been
developed in the context of an obligation to give due notice of
termination or pay in lieu, not in the context of a right to a
permanent job. Under collective agreements also "just cause" is
held not to refer to the difficulties of the employer,"12 but that is
always in the context of an employer's right to lay off, provided he
respects seniority rights. In a few cases where the courts have faced
statutory provisions which, in effect, granted "tenure" to
employees in local government or industry they have avoided the
implications of the common law definition of "cause", where
economic reality demanded it, by characterizing the termination as
something other than "dismissal" or "discharge." 3
Moreover, in some United States cases,"14 without any special
112. See Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, supra, note 16 at para.
7:3000 and ff.; and F. E. Palmer, Collective Agreement Arbitration in Canada
(Toronto: Butterworth. 1978) and Supplement (1980). Part II "Protection of
Employment (passim).
113. E.g. Town of Yarmouth v. Manser (1977), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 285 (N.S.S.C.,
A.D.); C.I.L. Inc. v. Porter (1980), 7 Nova Scotia Law News 36 (N.S.S.C.,
A.D.). In both cases the court was applying s.67A of the Nova Scotia Labour
Standards Code, S.N.S. 1972, c.10 (as am. by S.N.S. 1975, c.50, s.4 and 1976,
c.41 s. 15), which entitles an employee of ten years seniority who has been
dismissed without just cause to reinstatement, not just to damages. Among
Canadian jurisdictions only the Canada Labour Code provides a similar right, in
that case after one year of employment. See R.S.C. 1970, c.L-l, s.61.5 (as am. by
S.C. 1977-78, c.27, s.21).
114. E.G. Krotkoff v. Goucher College, supra, note 28. Note, however, contrary
to Goucher, McClelland v. Northern Ireland General Health Services Board,
[1957] 1 W.L.R. 594 (H.L.(N.J.) and Placsto v. Board of Humboldt School Unit
No. 47 of Saskatchewan (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 374 (Sask. Q.B.) to the effect that
dismissal from statutory employment for redundancy is invalid absent statutory
authorization. For a discussion of the legal issues relating to financial exigency in
the United States context, see John C. Tucker, "Financial Exigency - Rights,
Responsibilities and Recent Decisions" (1974), 2 Journal of College and
University Law 103; James B. Wilson, "Financial Exigency: Examination of
Recent Cases Involving Layoff of Tenured Faculty" (1977), 4 Journal of College
and University Law 187; James L. Petersen, "The Dismissal of Tenured Faculty
for Reasons of Financial Exigency" (1976), 51 Indiana L.J. 417; Comment,
"Financial Exigency as Cause for Termination of Tenured Faculty Members in
Private Post Secondary Educational Institutes" (1976), 62 Iowa L. Rev. 481. The
issue is also discussed in the general articles. See Note, "Dismissing Tenured
Facult-- X picp Z S , staN,", supra, wzk, li -a46,-49; Ak. .,#. MAas,
"Judicial Enforcement of Academic Tenure: An Examination", supra, note 106 at
611-13; Ronald C. Brown, "Tenure Rights in Contractual and Constitutional
Context", supra, note 26 and 286-88. For Canadian discussion, see "Tenure and
Cutbacks" (1973), 22(1) CAUT Bulletin at 4-17; "U. of T. report opposes
termination of tenured faculty for budgetary reasons" (1980), 27(2) CAUT
Bulletin 15. See also CAUT Handbook, supra note 58 at 31 ("Guidelines
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provision, in an academic contract of employment "cause" has
been held to cover situations of financial exigency, or even program
redundancy because of declining enrolment or loss of other forms of
support for particular courses and disciplines; situations, in other
words, having nothing to do with the qualities of the particular
professor. Effect has thus been given to the overriding powers of the
university government to manage the institution in what it perceives
to be the most efficient and effective manner, notwithstanding clear
recognition of tenure.
In an era of near drastic financial restraint at most institutions and
declining enrolment at many others this suggests that, while the
struggle to beget tenure as a legal concept may have been won, the
ultimate product may have some of the qualities of a paper tiger.
IV. Assessment: Special Plans and Collective Bargaining for
Faculty
(1) Special Plans.
With regard to special plans in general there is little to add to what
has already been said in outlining their legal nature. The main
problem from a legal point of view is that of ultimate enforceability
and, realistically, there is good reason to think that in many settings
that will not be a problem at all.
One common characteristic of the special plans is that in the event
of an impasse in the negotiation of the monetary package they
provide for settlement by arbitration. Indeed, it seems that the
whole reason for their existence is that the strike weapon, and the
threat thereof, has been considered inappropriate either by the
legislature or by faculty where the special plan has been voluntarily
chosen over union certification. Three different impasse resolution
mechanisms that have been adopted merit consideration.
Under the University of Toronto plan, if the parties have reached
an impasse by the 1st of February in each year a pre-agreed
mediator meets with them over the course of the following three
weeks and attempts to get them to agree. If they fail he then writes
their collective agreement, which goes for approval to the
Governing Council, the unicameral governing body of the
University, the employer in fact, for approval. Thus far in the
operation of that special plan, the first three monetary agreements
were written by the mediator and accepted by the Governing
Concerning Reductions in Academic Appointments for Budgetary Reasons").
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Council. The fourth was successfully negotiated without assistance
and the fifth was again written by the mediator.
One difficulty with the University of Toronto arrangement is, of
course, that there is no provision whatever for the situation where
the Governing Council rejects the settlement suggested by the
mediator. Presumably at that stage there would be a renewed
demand for certification, a threat of which the Governing Council is
no doubt aware. Another is that the nature of the process may
suggest different criteria for consideration by the mediator, wearing
his arbitrator's hat, than those taken into account by interest
arbitrators in the public sector, where virtually all "interest"
arbitration in Canada has occurred. In the most recent Toronto
report the mediator1 15 stated:
My natural inclination is to turn to the criteria evolved by interest
arbitrators in the public sector, particularly where they have been
acting without explicit statutory criteria. See Swan, Criteria in
Interest Arbitration (1978) and Adams, The Ontario Experience
with Interest Arbitration: Problems in Detecting Policy, (1980,
C.L.E. Society of B.C., at 59). Most commonly invoked is
comparability; comparisons with wage rates or increases granted
in the same industry or to those engaged in similar work in other
industries. The cost of living is also assumed to be very
important, and productivity and the inequity of requiring public
sector employees to subsidize the community by accepting
sub-standard wages and working conditions have been invoked
Interest arbitrators in the Canadian public sector have,
apparently, universally rejected the legitimacy of an "ability to
pay" argument. They have not allowed governments as
employers to hide behind their own skirts, in their role as the
source of funds, to escape pay increases indicated by the other
criteria. This has been so even where, as in the Ontario hospital
sector, the employing body and the funding body are legally and
formally different. . . The real point surely is that arbitrators in
the public sector, where "ability to pay" has been held not to be
an appropriate criterion, have been empowered or mandated by
law to determine, in effect, how many public resources should go
to pay the employee group whose pay is being arbitrated. That is
not the case here. I have no statutory mandate. I am merely
-_Mp , Ve_ 3b' th.t Mma 1dum Qf kZgeeMet tw make a
recommendation that becomes binding unless rejected by the
Governing Council of the University of Toronto.
115. Since "the mediator" was Professor Christie no comment on this passage
would appear to be in order.
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Of the other five universities with special plans, three, University
of Alberta, University of Prince Edward Island and Lethbridge
have opted for "final offer selection", the other two, University of
British Columbia and Calgary for conventional interest arbitration.
In conventional interest arbitration, the arbitrator simply imposes
a collective agreement that he thinks is fairest and best. Because it is
highly likely that in making such an inherently standardless decision
the arbitrator will split the difference between the parties, at least to
some degree, the prospect of arbitration has a "chilling effect" on
the parties' negotiations. That is, unless there is a good prospect of a
settlement, the tendency is for each party to maintain a polar
position in the hope of maximizing what it will get from the
arbitrator.
In order to avoid this readily observable "chilling effect", final
offer selection arbitration has been suggested. In this process the
arbitrator cannot split the difference. He must pick the final
proposal by one party or the other. Thus neither party will want to
come before the arbitrator in an obviously unreasonable stance. The
effect, of course, is to enhance negotiations. 116 Cautions have been
entered, however, about the desirability of a system that forces the
parties into a relationship which may include terms that, although
minor in the overall scheme of things, are almost impossible for one
of the parties to live with. That concern is obviously much more
relevant to issues of principle than to fungible monetary benefits. 1
7
116. There is a very considerable literature on the undesireable effects of
conventional interest arbitration and suggested alternatives. See for example
Weiler, Reconcilable Differences (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) at 229 ff. and Downie,
The Behavioural, Economic and Institutional Effects of Compulsory Interest
Arbitration (1979), Discussion Paper No. 147 prepared for the Economic Council
of Canada.
117. Haldimand Board of Education v. Ontario Secondary School Teachers
Federation, District 53 (Swan, Arbitrator), quoted in Hansen, supra, note 80.
When process is enhanced in final offer selection, the very characteristic of the
mechanism which increases the costs of disagreement (the threat of losing
totally) decreases the possibility of a result which is reasonably acceptable to the
parties and which therefore will conduce to a stable and harmonious relationship
during the currency of the agreement based on the selection, Although there are
methods of easing this effect, such as provision of alternate offers from each
side at use of issue setectio, the statuwry mechanism ava'ilable i Oatarl,
teaching negotiations is limited to the selection of "all of one of the final offers
on all matters remaining in dispute"; this is the model most likely to stress the
process of effective selection and to exacerbate its result deficiency.
If this analysis is correct, final offer selection is most likely to be effective in
disputes where process is critical and the result is less important. For the most
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Whichever method of arbitration is adopted there may still be
room for concern about the criteria adopted by the arbitrator. In an
era in which, measured against the rate of inflation, universities are
being consistently underfunded whether or not "ability to pay" is to
be taken seriously into account is a policy issue of the first
importance. If it is not addressed by the parties in their special plan,
or in legislation, each individual arbitrator will have to settle it,
whatever the intricacies of the process of which he is a part.
(2) Collective Bargaining.
With no very strong conviction for or against collective bargaining
for university faculty, our starting position is that if the majority of a
faculty want collective bargaining they should be allowed to have it.
Certainly there is no room for doubt that collective bargaining is
fITMIY enttnChed 'e the r 'om in Canada li un_- s ,q f _t y.
That said, it should be recognized that a very important aspect of
the collective bargaining system in this country is that a union and a
collective agreement enhance the dignity of employees as human
beings by giving them vehicles through which they have somewhat
more control over a very important aspect of their lives. Reality falls
short of that ideal, often far short; but the pursuit of that ideal is, to a
significant degree, the point of the system; and that point is not very
significant in the university context. Collegiality and self-
government, even if they too fall far short of the ideal, already give
faculty members a large measure of what collective bargaining was
to bestow.118
part, these will be circumstances where the parties are far apart on matters
where incremental movement is still possible. Most such cases will involve
economic issues - salaries, fringe benefits and related terms of employment
which can be reduced to dollar value. Such disputes are really disputes of
interest, and only the naive would suggest that any real questions of principle
are involved in what is essentially a matter of quantifying and bargaining and
costing out its impact. There is, therefore, no room for a principled refusal to
compromise, and no reason why the imposition of process costs of disagreement
through final offer selection are thought to produce, if not a settlement, at least a
movement toward settlement that will bring both final offers within the range of
acceptable solutions.
On the other hand, final offer selection is less likely to be effective where the
parties are far apart on matters where no incremental movement is possible -
matters of principle or of fundamental importance for only two positions (often
"yes" or "no") are available. . ..
118. This sort of consideration apparently loomed large in the thinking of the
majority in the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the U.S. in N.L.R.B. v.
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University collective agreements, even more than most others,
are enormously complex documents. They must address complex
problems and often they attempt sophisticated solutions, which are
frequently achieved, but the result is complicated; a document
which requires a great deal of committee time for administration,
and one which even the average university faculty member often
feels he cannot comprehend. Thus there is a danger of making
perpetual schoolroom lawyers of those who are interested enough to
involve themselves.
Against that, collective bargaining and the resulting collective
agreements bring greatly improved order and equity into university
employment. There are some who object to precisely what is being
put forward here as an advantage, who yearn for flexibility which,
they say, brings out the best in people. It is true, of course, that
willingness to accommodate in special situations is always part of a
healthy employment relationship, and it is certainly a necessary part
of a healthy collegial relationship, but neither will be lost by
developing clear rules to guide both university administrators and
faculty.
Under the first Dalhousie collective agreement for example, the
provisions for granting of merit increases and, more to the point, for
the denial of career development increments, explicitly called for
the faculty member to display the characteristics and to make the
contributions "judged relevant for appointment, re-appointment,
promotion, tenure and appointment without term."' 19
It is in connection with termination, of course, that the truly
sensitive issues in academia arise and that is, essentially, a matter of
tenure. Before turning back to tenure it is relevant to point out here
that the rights of probationary employees present a special issue in
provinces where collective bargaining is possible. The Canada and
British Columbia labour relations boards and a number of labour
arbitrators have taken the view that the requirement in labour
relations legislation that every collective agreement provide for final
and binding settlement of all disputes means that probationers
Yeshiva University, supra, note 68 in which university faculty were held to be
managerial. With respect, we suggest that a view such as the one expressed in the
text has little to do with the legal conclusion reached by the majority of the Court, a
conclusion which we consider to be wrong. See Levgold, Current Labour
Developments, February 1980 and, generally, Arthur P. Menard and Anne K.
Morrill "Are Faculty Members Scholars or Managers? The Yeshiva Case" (1979),
30 Labour Law J. 754, which preceeded the decision by the Supreme Court.
119. First Dalhousie Collective Agreement, article 29.06.
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cannot be denied access to a grievance procedure and that any
clause in a collective agreement to that effect will be overridden by
the legislation. 120 The Ontario Courts have explicitly upheld this
proposition12  but the recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Re Leeming, a case which arose under New Brunswick's
public sector collective bargaining legislation, puts it in some
doubt. 122 The New Brunswick Act does not have the compulsory
"final and binding settlement" provision found in all Canadian
private sector labour legislation so the Leeming case may be
distinguishable. However the interpretation of the collective
120. C.A.L.F.A.A., Local No. 13 and Transair Ltd., [1978] 2 Canadian L.R.B.R.
354 (Can. L.R.B.); Cassiar Asbestos Corp. Ltd., [1974] 1 Canadian L.R.B.R.
428, affd by the full Board at [1975] 1 Canadian L.R.B.R. 212 (B.C.L.R.B.); Re
Hydro Electric Commission of Borough of North York, [1974] 6 L.A.C. (2d) 113
(Carter, Chairman); cf. International Waxes Ltd. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union (1978), 79 C.L.L.C. para. 14,203 (Ont. H.C. D.C.),
but subsequently Re Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. (1979), 20 L.A.C. (2d), 392
(Prichard).
121. In C.U.P.E. Local I v. The Toronto Hydro Electric System (1980), 111
D.L.R. (3d) 693, the Ontario Divisional Court ruled that the parties to a collective
agreement could not contract out of the arbitration provisions of the Labour
Relations Act, stating at 697:
This, of course, does not mean that the parties cannot agree to a basis of
arbitral review that would render the results of arbitration a foregone
conclusion. This was not done here, but the parties might have agreed, for
example, that probationary employees may be discharged on the sole discretion
of the employer. This *tould make such a discharge almost impossible to
overturn. Nevertheless, a probationary employee could attempt, through the
arbitration procedure, to do so, albeit unsuccessfully. There is a clear distincion
between rights and access to arbitration about those rights. Section 37 deals with
the latter issue, not the former. The aim of section 37 is to ensure that access to
arbitration is available in all cases of differences to prevent festering resentment
between the parties about unresolvable disagreements. We believe that aim is
best served by the interpretation adopted here.
The company obtained leave to appeal but the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed
the appeal, (1981), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 512, stating, at 512:
While we do not necessarily agree with the interpretation placed on the terms
of the collective agreement by the arbitrator and the majority of the Divisional
Court that is not the issue. We are all of the view that the interpretation placed
on the relevant terms of the collective agreement as they presently stand is one
which they can reasonably bear and certainly is not an interpretation which is
patently unreasonable. In the result, accordingly the appeal is dismissed "vith
costs.
On December 15, 1980, the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal from
the Ontario Court of Appeal. The case is now concluded: (1981] 17 Labour
Arbitration News - March issue, p. 1.
122. (1981), 34 N.R. 480 (S.C.C.).
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agreement there in question by Martland J. (for the Court) does
deem to make it clear that where the parties give the employer a
high degree of discretion in determining whether to retain a
probationary employee, the exercise of that discretion is not
imypalt i th t At 1-b )U Itg:slawn, -and 'tht lzpslawon dlo n
justify an arbitrator in imposing his standards on the employer. It is
submitted, however, that the Supreme Court has not held that the
employer's exercise of his power can be freed from neutral scrutiny
to ensure compliance with the collective agreement.
For tenured faculty collective bargaining has not in all situations
produced a clearer or more favourable situation substantively, in
two respects. First, in some collective agreements, "cause" is
specifically given a relatively high content as a basis for the removal
of tenure.1 23 While the Dalhousie agreement seems to be unique
and a trifle paranoid in its spelling out of "malicious damage to
University property" as a ground for the removal of tenure,'
24
Ottawa's agreement is potentially more threatening in its definition
of conduct worthy of disciplinary measures to extend to;
. . . incompetence of a professor or to his unfitness to maintain
appropriate level of quality relative to his participation in the
general work of the University. 
12 5
Second, in some collective agreements failure to comply with the
terms of the collective agreement is included as a ground for
removal of tenure. 126 Such a provision may be comparatively
123. The "cause" provisions vary quite a lot from the bareness of the Acadia
agreement, which in Articles l1b.2t and 14.21 simply talks about "just and proper
cause" without further definition or elaboration to agreements such as that at
Dalhousie (Article 26.01):
. . . gross misconduct; misrepresentation of credentials; persistent neglect of
duty to students or to the University; failure to maintain an acceptable standard
of competence and performance in duties appropriate to the appointment;
malicious damage to University property . . . Illness, including drug addiction,
alcoholism and psychological disorders, are not causes for disciplinary action
and shall be considered in accordance with the provisions for Clauses. ...
Illness is sometimes not dealt with separately (Acadia) but it is now common to
follow the Dalhousie practice and deal with it separately (see e.g., York, Article
15.04). Note, however, Saskatchewan, Article 31.4.2, which makes a failure to
make reasonable attempts to rehabilitate oneself or to follow an active treatment
programme a ground it 7ri'isszl.
124. Article 26.01.
125. Article 33.28.
126. See University of Ottawa agreement, Article 33.28-29. Indeed, even when
not included, failure to live up to the duties specified in the collective agreement
could presumably be seen as "cause" where that is defined to include neglect of
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innocuous where the failure has to be "persistent" 127 or where the
duties of the professor specified in the collective agreement are
either not unduly onerous or spelt out with precision. 128 However,
on occasion, it seemingly goes much further in that any breach is
potentially a ground for dismissal and the duties imposed on
professors represent aspirations of the highest excellence or are
stated so vaguely as to mean almost anything.' 2 9 To take just one
example from the now expired Windsor agreement, it is the duty of
professors
... to foster and maintain a learning environment which is
productive of scholarly learning.130
Concerns about such clauses are alleviated to some extent by
provision for independent arbitration of disputes over dismissal
from tenured positions in all collective agreements. But that is not a
standards in collective agreements may come to be regarded as the
norm and by custom be implied into contracts and rules at
universities without collective agreements and without provision for
independent arbitration.
Another limitation on tenure that has crept into a couple of
collective agreements is that of tenure review, something that the
Ontario Federation of Students has called for recently,131 reflecting,
duties or where it is left undefined.
127. The York University agreement talks in Article 15.03 of
(a) failure to discharge professional responsibility as defined by the agreement
either through
(i) incompetence or
(ii) persistent neglect including persistent neglect of duty to students or
scholarly/professional pursuits.
Under the Ottawa agreement (article 33.29), reprimand and suspension are
obviously contemplated as the appropriate remedies except in the most serious
cases.
128. See e.g., Article 5.20 of the Acadia Agreement.
129. The Rights and Responsibilities clauses in the Carleton Agreement (Article
15.1-2) are particularly broad and detailed in the duties that they impose on faculty
under the collective agreement. See also Article 15 of the Dalhousie Agreement.
130. Article 5.10(a). We have not seen the new agreement to ascertain whether
%tig31 ICUl pZS1'a h% 'aX fetbe~e mt~n
13 1. "Test teachers students urge", Toronto Sunday Star, 3 February, 1980.
University Professors should face review every four years, to make sure they're
fit to teach, Ontario student leaders say.
.. . Last year, fewer than a half a dozen tenured professors were fired in
universities across Canada.
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one suspects, the perspective of many members of the public about
the privileged position of university teachers. Under the University
of Regina agreement, for example, there is an annual review of all
members of faculty and removal from a tenured position for
"Incompetence demonstrated by annual review reports'" is
specifically mentioned as a ground. 132 Under the University of
Ottawa agreement, the same applies though in slightly different
form. The denial of two successive progress through the ranks
increments can form the basis for the commencement of dismissal
proceedings and, though grievance procedures are available upon
any such denial and the successive denials cannot be the sole basis
for removal of tenure, this procedure has already been used to
dismiss a tenured faculty member. 1
33
Indeed, it is somewhat sobering to read the majority of the
Arbitration Board's conclusions about the obligations of a professor
with tenure, based on an interpretation of one of the provisions in
the Ottawa agreement.
It is clear to the Board that a faculty member has a duty to
perform his functions in a professional manner and that implicit
in that duty is the obligation to improve his professional
effectiveness, more or less continuously . . . It follows that
''maintaining" his qualifications does not mean simply not
losing them, but involves making consistent efforts to improve
them. 134
So much for tenure being either a license to do nothing for the rest
of one's academic life or, for that matter, a recognition by the
university of having attained a level of performance that will
thereafter always be considered satisfactory.
While not in all instances providing as strong a guarantee of
tenure as some people would advocate, the advent of collective
bargaining has rendered one other great service to the institution of
tenure beyond its assurances of a firm legal basis and of independent
arbitration. In a number of institutions it has ensured that staff
reductions for reasons of financial exigency and, in some cases,
program redundancy, it they ever come to affect tenured positions,
will not produce regulatory chaos and arbitrary decision-making. 135
132. Article 14.1.3.1.
133. Article 33.30.
134. Vanasse v. University of Ottawa, unreported award of Arbitration Board,
June 1980 (Professors J. Percy South and Gilles Paquet (majority), Professor A.E.
Malloch dissenting). The quotation is from the fourth page of the majority award.
135. See e.g., Article 17 of the Carleton Agreement; Article 14 of the St. Thomas
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While the prospect is not one that many university teachers can face
with equanimity, the problem has at least been anticipated and
procedures have been thrashed out. In many instances, those
procedures give substantially greater protection to those with tenure
than to those without and, even where tenure has not achieved
paramountcy, reasonably precise formulae for determining the order
of lay-off and recall are in place. All of this could be brought about
without collective bargaining, but the chances of a fair financial
exigency policy being in place does seem to be enhanced by a
collective bargaining regime.
V. Conclusion
Many important issues relating to tenure, such as procedures in
relation to either the grant or removal of tenure, have been given
very short sbxift here. Some of the intransigent problems that have
arisen in relation to confidentiality of assessments and sources of
assessment in tenure applications136 have not been discussed.
Concern here has been with the legal basis of this cornerstone of
academic freedom. Examination reveals that, despite almost
universal, even if at time grudging, acceptance of the institution of
tenure, the legal foundations upon which it rests are not as clear as
one might have perhaps suspected, save in collective bargaining
situations.
What we may be witnessing in this area, and what in the long run
may be desirable, is the development of tenure (outside of the
collectively organized universities) as a hybrid creature having
some of the characteristics of both a statutory office and a
contractual relationship. 137 The evidence for this so far tends to be
Agreement; Articles 15-16 of the former Windsor Agreement; Article 24 of the
York Agreement: Articles 28-29 of the Manitoba Agreement (which includes both
programme redundancy and financial exigency); Article 24 of the Regina
Agreement. Not all collective agreements have exigency provisions, however (e.g.
Acadia Agreement).
136. That subject is in fact covered within Professor Beverley McLachlin's paper
delivered at the Conference (see supra, note 3) entitled "References, Records and
Evaluations: The Law of Privileged Communications" (now published as
"Educational Records and the Right to Privacy" (1981), 15 U.B.C. L.R. 175) .
For subsequent litigation maintaining privilege for confidential assessments
submittted as part of a salary review and promotion process, see Re University of
Guelph and Canadian Association of University Teachers (1980), 112 D.L.R. (3d)
6 92 (Ont. H.C.).
137. This theme of the necessity to develop "a body of law particularly sensitive
to the needs of the academic milieu" is developed in a more detailed and also
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much stronger in other areas of statutorily-regulated employer-
employee relationships such as those existing between a police
officer and a police force or between a physician and a hospital
board dispensing hospital privileges.1 38 Yet there is no reason why
some of these developments could not apply to university professors
as well.
To take the remedy of reinstatement as an example; the fact that it
is difficult to view tenure as either a pure statutory office or a purely
contractual matter could lead the courts to the conclusion that,
whether the claim was for a public law remedy or for specific
performance, reinstatement should be neither automatically availa-
ble nor unavailable. Rather it should be in the discretion of the court
in any particular case. Granting specific performance could reflect
concerns for accepted notions of academic freedom and an absence,
somewhat different way by Matthew W. Finkin, "Toward a Law of Academic
Status" (1972-73), 22 Buffalo Law Review 575. (The quote can be found at 602.)
138. Of particular interest in this regard is the discussion of this issue by Lord
Wilberforce (a member of the majority) in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation,
supra, note 19 in which he talks about "the risk of a compartmental approach
which, though convenient as a solvent, may lead to narrower distinctions than are
appropriate to the broader issues of administrative law" (id., at 1595). This case
involved the dismissal of a school teacher and, in the course of deciding that the
dismissal was a nullity and the applicant entitled to redirection, a Scottish public
law remedy, because of the lack of a hearing, he indicated fairly clearly that he did
not approve of the earlier Privy Council decision of Vidyodaya University Council
v. Silva, [1965] 1 W.L.R. 77 (P.C.(Cey.)), in which a dismissed university
professor in what was then Ceylon was held to be restricted to contract as opposed
to administrative law remedies because, while his employment was regulated by
statute, his relationship with the university was still that of a servant to master.
Lord Wilberforce (at 1596) expressed the view that in England or Scotland the
existence of such a statutory content "would tend to show . . . that it was [a
relationship] of a sufficiently public character, or one partaking sufficiently of the
nature of an office to attract appropriate remedies of administrative law".
Nicholson, supra, note 19, provides a good Canadian police example and for a
hospital privileges decision, see Abouna v. Foothills Provincial General Hospital
Board (No. 2) (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 220 (Alta. S.C., T.D.), a case where
damages were recovered for wrongful dismissal but in which the basis of liability
was found in public law cases dealing with the dismissal of office-holders. On
appeal the damages were reduced: (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 333 (Alta. S.C., A.D.).
Also of some interest here is Herring v. Templeman, supra, note 8, in which
Russell L.J. doubted the availability of the public law remedy of certiorari in
relation to the explusion of a student from a university. He criticized the earlier
Divisional Court judgment of R. v. Aston University Senate, Ex Parte Roffey,
supra, note 8, in which certiorari was held to be the proper remedy to seek in
challenging an expulsion from a University established by Royal Charter.
According to Russell L.J. this was incorrect as it was a matter of contract - not
public law (see 584-585).
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generally, of a breakdown of relations between the faculty member
affected and his colleagues. The frequency of reinstatement as a
form of relief specifically mentioned in university collective
agreements, special plans and even in non-collectively organized
universities' rules is evidence of the acceptability of such relief in
the university context. On the other hand, the possibility clearly
exists of situations where reinstatement, the normal consequence of
a public law remedy, should not automatically follow from breach
of the rules by the university, because difficulties within a
university can, of course, flow from a breakdown of personal
relationships such that an enforced resumption of employment or
office might not appear to be desirable, monetary relief being more
appropriate.1 39
Viewing tenure as a hybrid creature would also enable the courts
to be more flexible on whether the rules relating to tenure could be
changed than would be the case if it were simply contractual, and
could possibly lead to the imposition of due process requirements
before such changes could take effect.' 40 It also leaves the courts
139. A good example of this kind of compromise being accepted by the courts at
the point where public and private law concepts intersect is provided by the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Bellechasse Hospital Corporation v.
Pilotte, supra, note 15, an appeal from the province of Quebec. A doctor had been
dismissed from the staff of the hospital contrary to regulations promulgated under
the relevant statute and sought mandamus (a public law remedy) to compel his
reinstatement. Normally, from a public law perspective, one would expect that
relief to flow automatically from the failure to abide by the rules. Nevertheless, the
Court, by reference to some of the considerations that frequently intrude in the
private law of contract, held that the applicant had to be content with his remedy in
damages. Employment was available elsewhere and there was a strong chance that
his reinstatement would cause further friction in the hospital. (At 461-463 per de
Grandpre J. delivering the judgment of a four-person court). This notion of a hybrid
status also gains some support from the struggle of the courts with the issue of
whether a person wrongly dismissed from a statutory office is automatically
entitled to salary from the date of dismissal to the date of judgment or whether
financial confederation is subject to the same considerations as pertain to damages
at common law for wrongful dismissal viz there is a duty to mitigate. money earned
elsewhere has to be taken account of. See eg. Emms v. The Queen (1979), 102
D.L.R. (3d) 193, discussed by Mullan. "Developments in Administrative Law The
1979-8OTerm" (1981), 2Sup. Ct. L.R. I at 11-18.
140. At common law, the Canadian courts have not been willing to accept that
rule-making agencies generally have an obligation to advertise proposed rules in
advance and give interested persons an opportunity to comment (see e.g., Re
Braeside Farms and Treasurer of Ontario (1978), 30 O.R. (2d), 541 (H.C.,
D.C.)). However, where the proposed rule in fact involves the resolution of a
dispute involving the direct interests of particular individuals (e.g., a by-law
rezoning a particular piece of property), procedural obligations may be implied
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free to imply a reqvirement of fair procedures in that the existing
procedures for the grant and removal of tenure have to be followed,
whether anything is specifically incorporated in a letter of
appointment or not.
This, of course, is highly speculative. It must be reiterated that
tenure as a legal status has a much more clearly defined and certain
basis in existing collective agreements than it has either at common
law or under constituent university statutes. Collective bargaining
may therefore be preferable in any situation where there are serious
concerns about the legal status of tenured faculty and the rights of
those in the tenure stream. However, collective bargaining, while
putting tenure -on a much surer legal basis than exists at
non-organized universities, does not necessarily guarantee that the
substance of tenure will be any greater than at non-organized
universities. In good institutions, the advent of collective bargaining
may well have weakened its substantive content, subject, of course,
to the offsetting benefits of independent arbitration. It must also be
reiterated that provisions guaranteeing independent arbitration of
tenure disputes and specifying reinstatement as a remedial
alternative have the clear potential even in non-organized
universities to overcome many of the existing legal difficulties.
Finally, there is little cause for the kind of panic reaction that
must have been behind the amendments to the British Columbia and
Alberta legislation. In other provinces a number of faculty unions
have opted for "structural" agreements, with annual re-opening of
the moetax'j package, s%, taect to some. fm of 2,tboat . That
approach makes sense, because university faculty appear to have
little significant withholding power. A faculty strike would
engender absolutely no public sympathy, there would be no
economic pressure, indeed it would be a money-saving event, and
only if the strike went on long enough that students faced the
prospect of losing a year would there be any significant political
pressure. Even then the public pressure would be nothing compared
with that which public school teachers can exert by withdrawing
their free babysitting service. Why, then, have the governments of
Alberta and British Columbia withdrawn the right to organize under
(Wiswell v. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, [1965] S.C.R. 512).
While not quite the same kind of rule-making, rules which have the effect of
changing particular individuals' contracts of employment are sufficiently analogous
to the Wiswell type of situation to generate a good argument for implied procedural
requirements of such cases.
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the labour relations legislation? Universities in British Columbia are
subject to the Essential Services Disputes Act. 141 If there is real fear
of the impact of a strike by faculty, why not leave it at that? But
perhaps that was not the basis of the amendment, because in British
Columbia non-academic employees of the universities are not
denied access to collective bargaining rights although, with a strike
of any length they too can cause the institutions to grind to a halt.
And why, in British Columbia, is there a distinction between
university faculty and college faculty?
From a legal point of view, a carefully negotiated and well
drafted collective agreement subject to provincial labour legislation
is certainly an effective way to clear up many of the uncertainties in
the university employment relationship. However, if the university
is prepared seriously to negotiate a broadly inclusive special plan
enforceable by arbitration to which individual faculty members have
reasonable access the difference is not very great. It is, essentially,
the right to strike.
141. S.B.C. 1977, c.8 3 .
